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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VERDON C. BRINKERHOFF,
Case No. 890499-CA

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

:
Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a trial de novo in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, reinstating respondent's
driver's license, which license was suspended following an
administrative adjudicative proceeding of the Division of Driver
License Services, Department of Public Safety, (DLS), State of
Utah.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. 5
U.S. Const, amend. 14
Utah Code Ann. S 41-2-130
Utah Code Ann. S 41-2-131
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-3(l)

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) & (ii)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-ll
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a)
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(5)
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the failure of DLS to notify respondent

personally in writing prior to the administrative adjudicative
proceeding whether the proceeding was to be conducted formally or
informally resulted in a denial of due process under Utah law and
the Utah and United States Constitutions.
2.

Whether the Order of Suspension issued to

respondent by DLS failed to substantially comply with Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i), so as to deny respondent due process of
law under determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.
The Third District Court judgment reinstated the
driver's license of Verdon C. Brinkerhoff (Brinkerhoff) the
respondent, following a decision by DLS in an informal
adjudicative proceeding to suspend Brinkerhoff's driving
privileges for 90 days for driving under the influence of
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alcohol.

In accordance with Utah Code Ann. S§ 41-2-130 and 41-2-

131, and based upon sworn testimony and official documents, DLS
and the District Court found that:
1.

The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to

believe that Brinkerhoff was operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, in violation Utah Code Ann. § 416-44 (T. 64).
2.

Brinkerhoff consented to an intoxilizer test which

measured his blood alcohol concentration at .10 grams in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (T. 64).
3.

Neither the DUI Summons and Citation/Notice of

Intent to Suspend or Revoke/Temporary Driver License, nor the
notice of administrative hearing provided to Brinkerhoff prior to
the DLS hearing, contained any language that would have informed
him as to whether the administrative procedure was formal or
informal in nature.
4.

The order and decision served upon

Brinkerhoff

following the administrative adjudicative proceeding did not
contain the reasons for decision as required by Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-5(1)(i) & (ii)/ and that said order was conclusary and
merely stated the language of the applicable statute.
5.

Because of the failure of DLS to comply with the

requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act in designating
the hearing as formal or informal and failing to state in the
order and decision the reasons therefore, respondent was denied
due process and is entitled to the relief of reinstatement of his
driving privilege.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
On October 26, 1988, Sergeant Ferraro of the South Salt
Lake City Police Department arrested respondent, Verdon C.
Brinkerhoff, for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.
After Brinkerhoff was arrested, Officer Ferraro requested a blood
alcohol concentration test and gave him the department's standard
admonition explaining the possible consequences if the result of
the test was .08 grams or greater (T. 12). Brinkerhoff consented
and submitted to an intoxilizer test.

The results indicated a

blood alcohol concentration of .105 grams (T. 5-6).
After the intoxilizer test, Brinkerhoff was given a
Miranda warning and was asked a few questions about his drinking.
He was then personally served with a DUI Summons and Citation,
Notice of Intent to Suspend and Temporary License which notified
Brinkerhoff in writing of the intent of DLS to suspend his driver
license for a period of 90 days, which suspension would begin 31
days from the date of the summons and citation.

The summons also

notified Brinkerhoff of his right to request a hearing before the
Driver License Division to determine if his license should be
suspended.

(See Addendum A ) .
The record shows that Brinkerhoff timely requested a

hearing before the Driver License Division concerning the
propriety of the suspension of his license.

Counsel for

Brinkerhoff also requested discovery of all materials intended to
be used by DLS at the administrative hearing.

Those materials

were provided by the Department, along with a notice of the time

set for hearing (See Addendum B). A hearing was given with
testimony being taken, and all relevant documents and evidence
were before the hearing examiner. (See Addendum C).
examiner found the suspension appropriate.

The hearing

A record of the

findings of fact and conclusions of the hearing officer were
prepared, which record was made available to respondent upon
request (See Addendum D).
At the beginning of the Administrative hearing, counsel
for respondent asked the hearing officer, Brian Call, whether the
hearing was being conducted as a formal or informal hearing.

The

hearing officer stated that it was an informal hearing and no
further objection or motion was made at that time by respondent.
(See Addendum C at 3). Only after the conclusion of the
administrative hearing, did counsel for respondent state that the
action should be dismissed on the grounds that DLS had not
complied with the Administrative Procedures Act in that no notice
had been given prior the hearing whether the hearing was to be
conducted formally or informally.

(See Addendum C at 25-26).

On November 25, 1988, DLS mailed Brinkerhoff an Order
of Suspension (See Addendum E) indicating that the Brinkerhoff's
license had been suspended for a period of three months effective
November 25, 1988, and stating the reasons for the decision.

The

order also indicated that Brinkerhoff had the right to appeal the
action of the department within 30 days in a court of record.

On

December 2, 1988, Brinkerhoff filed a Verified Petition for
Judicial Review in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

In addition, Brinkerhoff also filed an ex

parte motion for stay of the Order of Suspension of DLS pending
the outcome of the trial de novo in the District Court.

The

motion for stay of the Order of Suspension was granted by Judge
Moffat on December 5, 1988, and Brinkerhoff's full driving
privileges were reinstated during the pendency of the judicial
review.

(See Addendum F).

Brinkerhoff was then given a trial de

novo at the District Court level.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The DUI Citation, Notice of Intent to Suspend and
Notice of Hearing provided to respondent prior to the
administrative adjudicative hearing, gave respondent actual
notice of DLS' intent to suspend his license for 90 days for
driving under the influence of alcohol and notified him of his
opportunity for a hearing prior to suspension.

In addition, the

promulgation and publication of administrative rules by DLSf
indicating that its administrative hearings are conducted
informally under UAPA, gave respondent constructive notice that
his hearing was to be informal.
The Order of Suspension sent respondent pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) complied in all material respects
with the statute by providing the decision, the reasons for the
decision, notice of any right of administrative or judicial
review and the time limits for requesting review.

Formal

findings of fact and conclusions were prepared by the hearing
officer and made available to respondent upon request in writing.
By failing to request the formal findings and conclusions from
DLS, respondent should not now be allowed to claim he did not
have access to them.

DLS complied with the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act and its own administrative rules in the conduct of
respondent's administrative hearing in all material respects.
Pursuant to these procedures, respondent requested and received
discovery of documents germane to the proceedings and appeared
and fully participated in the hearing.

Participation included

the opportunity to present any relevant evidence and to crossexamine witnesses.

By participating fully in the administrative

process and failing to timely request that the proceeding be
converted to a formal proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-4(3), respondent should now be estopped from asserting his
due process rights have been violated.
Procedural due process, under the Utah and United
States Constitutions, require that a person be given reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard and present any claim or
defense.

Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be

heard at the administrative level.

In addition, in an effort to

cure any minor procedural deficiencies, respondent was given a
trial de novo in the District Court in which he had a full
opportunity to conduct discovery and present any claim or
defense.

The record fully supports the fact that respondent's

due process rights were adequately safeguarded and the forms used
by DLS in its hearing process were adequately clear to provide
notice of the right to hearing and met due process requirements.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT IN THE CONDUCT
OF ITS ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(l) provides that all
adjudicative administrative proceedings shall be initiated by a
notice of agency action if the proceedings are initiated by the
agency.

Subsection (2)(a)(v) further provides that notice of the

agency action shall include "a statement of whether the
adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally according
to the provisions of rules adopted under §§ 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5
or formally according to the provisions of §§ 63-46b-6 to 63-46b11."

In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) requires that

after the close of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that
states the decision, the reasons for the decision, a notice of
any right of administrative or judicial review available and time
limits for filing an appeal or requesting review.
Failure to notify whether the hearing was formal of
informal, and failure to put formal findings of fact and
conclusions in the subsequent order are the only two areas in
which Brinkerhoff asserts DLS failed to comply with the
Administrative Procedures Act.

The record supports that these

are the reasons the District Court determined to reinstate
Brinkerhoff's license (T. 65-66).
Section 63-46b-4 of the Administrative Procedures Act,
allows an agency to designate by rule whether its adjudicative

proceedings are to be conducted informally or formally, according
to the procedures established in the act.

This section also

provides that all agency adjudicative proceedings not designated
as informal by the agency shall be conducted formally.

DLS

promulgated such rules through the rule-making process, held
public hearings on the rules as required by law, and made them
generally available to the public.

The rules are published in

the Utah Administrative Code to ensure easy public access and
allow affected parties to ascertain the contents of the rules.
The rule-making process and publication of rules are designed to
communicate to the general public the standards by which the
agency operates in its administrative hearings.

Brinkerhoff had

easy access to these rules and chose not to avail himself of
them.

(See Addendum G.)
Rule R712-017-3 of the Utah Driver License Division

Rules for Administrative Proceedings defines hearing as "an
informal adjudicative proceeding where evidence is to be taken to
determine an issue of fact and adjudicate a prior legal right
based on the division record, evidence, documents and
information."

(See Addendum G p. 1). In addition, Rule R712-

017-6 (see Addendum G. p. 2) designates all adjudicative
proceedings, except actions mandated by statute, as informal
unless "converted to formal in the discretion of the presiding
officer or supervisor."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-466-4(3) also allows

an administrative hearing to be converted from formal to informal
or informal to formal.

Such a conversion of a hearing under the

statute would not negate the entire proceeding, even if a party

had been originally notified that the hearing was to be conducted
in another manner.

Obviously notice of whether the hearing was

to be formal or informal, alone, is not determinative of whether
the proceeding is fundamentally fair to the affected party.
The promulgation and publication of the administrative
rules provided constructive notice of the informal nature of the
adjudicative proceeding, and substantially complied with the
clear intent of the statute.

If respondent chose not to avail

himself of the published rules of the Department, he should not
now be able to assert that he had not received actual notice as
to the informal nature of the proceeding.

Respondent requested

and received, prior to the hearing, all documents used by Driver
License Services in the hearing.

(See Addendum B.)

If he was,

in reality, unaware of the nature of the proceedings he needed
merely ask the Department in his request for documents.
Following the conclusion of the administrative hearing,
respondent received a signed Order of Suspension indicating the
decision by the presiding officer of Driver License Services and
the reasons for the decision. (See Addendum E).

The reason for

the decision was stated in the order as follows;
The grounds for such action is Utah Code Ann.
S 41-2-130 and that a peace officer had
reasonable grounds to believe you had been
operating a motor vehicle in violation of
U.C.A. § 41-6-44 (driving under the influence
law).
The Administrative Procedures Act in § 63-46^-5(1)(i) requires
only four items be contained in the signed order.
follows:

They are as

(1) the decision (see Addendum &, para. 1), (2) the

reasons for the decision (see Addendum E£, para. 3), (3) a notice

of any right of administrative or judicial review available to
the parties (see Addendum E, para- 7), (4) the time limits for
filing an appeal or requesting review (see Addendum BT, para. 7).
The signed order provided to Brinkerhoff contained each of the
four items listed.

Under the statute it need contain no more.

In the District Court proceedings, Judge Moffat
determined that the Department's Order of Suspension did not
comply with the Act in that it stated a legal conclusion of the
statute rather than setting forth the factual basis of the
decision.

The Court indicated that this factual basis should be

contained in the order that is mailed to the parties and failure
to do so results in prejudicial error necessitating reinstatement
of the driver's license (T. 66). The Court indicated that the
parties are entitled under the statute to know what the facts
were upon a decision was based (T. 66).
Appellant does not deny that a party to an
administrative hearing is entitled to know the basis upon which
the decision is reached.

However, in driver license suspension

hearings, the issue is so narrow as to be covered by the
statement of the reason for decision in the order.

The actual

findings and conclusions of the hearing officer are made a part
of the administrative record and are available upon request.
Rule R712-017-9 (Addendum G) requires a presiding officer to make
a written summary of relevant findings of fact and legal
conclusions arrived at, along with a brief recommendation.
rule further indicates that these findings, conclusions and
recommendations are to be transmitted to a superior for the
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The

preparation of an order, such as was done in this case, and made
available to the parties upon request in writing. (See R712-0179(7) Addendum G).

The benefit to a party in requiring DLS to

mail a copy of this report following each hearing would be
substantially outweighed by the additional time and cost
involved.

The mere fact that Brinkerhoff chose not to provide

the Driver License Service with a written request for the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing officer,
should not permit him to maintain that he was unaware of this
information.

Nowhere in the statute is it required that the

order itself contain these findings of fact and conclusions, but
only that it contain the four items discussed, supra, pg. 9.
In discussing adjudicative procedure, Kenneth Culp
Davis stated:
the closest approach to a unifying pr*..w*^-w
is that courts set aside the administrative
choice only for clear illegality or for abuse
of discretion; this principle is applied to
many problems, including pleadings,
intervention, place and time of hearings,
delay, consolidation of proceedings, degree
of formality and informality, order of
proceedings and off the record discussions.
See Davis, Administrative Law Text, (3d ed. 1972 pg. 212)
(emphasis added).
In the instant case, there has been no "clear
illegality" or "abuse of discretion".

The DUI Citation and

Notice of Intent to Suspend (Addendum A) accompanied with the
notice of hearing (Addendum B p. 3), gave Brinkerhoff notice of
Driver License Services' intention to suspend his license for 90
days and notified him of his opportunity for a hearing prior to

the suspension.

The promulgation of administrative rules by DLS

also gave Brinkerhoff constructive notice of the informal nature
of the proceedings.

See Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323 (1979).
POINT II

BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE INFORMAL
NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOW BE ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THAT THE INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS
DENIED HIM PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) provides that any time
before a final order is issued in an adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer may convert an informal proceeding to a formal
proceeding, if such a conversion would be in the public interest
and not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.

The record

of the administrative adjudicative hearing clearly indicates that
counsel for respondent questioned the hearing examiner at the
beginning of the hearing as to whether the proceeding was being
conducted formally or informally.

(See Addendum C p. 3). Upon

being notified that the proceeding was informal, the hearing
proceeded with no further objections.

Respondent was able to

cross-examine witnesses of the department, call his own witnesses
and present any evidence he felt germane to the proceeding.
In closing argument at the administrative hearing,
respondent's counsel stated, "... this per se action should be
dismissed on the grounds that the division has not complied with
the Administrative Procedures Act in the following respects.
First of all, the first time we received notice that this was a
formal or informal hearing was when Mr. Call himself indicated
that this was an informal hearing."

-13-

Respondent however, made no

indication of how he was prejudiced from this failure of notice
or in any way denied an opportunity to discover any relevant
information or to appear and be fully heard.
pgs. 25-26).

(See Addendum C

Had Brinkerhoff been in any way prejudiced by the

informal nature of the hearing, counsel should have requested the
hearing officer to allow the proceeding to be converted to a
formal hearing as allowed pursuant to § 63-46b-4.

Respondent, as

a result of his own in action, should now be estopped from
claiming he was prejudiced by the proceeding in which he fully
participated.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized that a
driver's license is a privilege and not a fundamental right.
Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323 (1979).

Although the privilege is

constitutionally protected, due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and under
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 only require that a person be given
notice of intention to terminate the license and an opportunity
for hearing prior to termination.

Smith at 324, 325. The forms

used by DLS in the instant case were adequate to give notice of
an intent, to suspend and of the right to a hearing.

By

appearing and fully participating Brinkerhoff obviously had
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard prior to his
license being terminated.

Such participation should now preclude

respondent from asserting his due process rights were somehow
violated.

Counsel for Brinkerhoff had a duty to request the

hearing be conducted formally at the outset.

DLS has also been informed and believes that counsel
for respondent had actual notice of the informal nature of the
proceedings.

Respondent's counsel has appeared at other driver

license suspension hearings which have also been conducted on an
informal basis.

Counsel's actual notice of the nature of the

proceedings from prior hearings should not allow him to now claim
DLS failed to notify him of the informal nature of this
proceeding.
POINT III
THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO
REVIEW BY TRIAL DE NOVO THE FINAL ORDER OF
THE DIVISION OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
GUARANTEES RESPONDENT REASONABLE NOTICE,
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT ANY
CLAIM OR DEFENSE RELATIVE TO THE PROCEEDING.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 allows a person whose license
has been suspended or revoked by the Division to seek judicial
review of DLS's final order.

The Administrative Procedures Act

in § 63-46b-15(1)(a) states that "the district court shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from any informal adjudicative proceedings."

DLS's

adjudicative proceedings are informal as provided by
Administrative Rule R712-017-6.

Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-

4(5) provides that the district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in chapter 46b,
title 63, "and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings."

This includes

the requirement that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah
Rules of Evidence be applied.
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The Utah Code, prior to the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), provided no uniform procedures for agency
adjudication and judicial review.

Some agency decisions were

reviewed "on the record" by an appellate court but with various
standards of review, other agencies were made subject to "on the
record" review by trial courts and still other agencies received
de novo review in a trial court.

With the adoption of UAPA in

1987, and numerous amendments enacted in 1988, an attempt was
made to resolve these disparities.

In the overview of UAPA

written by Allen D. Sullivan, Vice-Chairman of the Advisory
Committee, the statement is made that one of the purposes of the
act was to give a "uniform and rational framework for judicial
review of agency action."

(See Addendum H).

UAPA reflects two principles for the development of a
uniform system for judicial review of agency action.

First,

agencies that devote sufficient formality, due process protection
and record building into an administrative adjudication should be
entitled to deference as to the factual record and findings by a
reviewing court.

An agency that processes a large number of

cases, on the other hand, at more informal levels of procedure
with a lower level of due process protection, should be reviewed
de novo for the protection of the affected party.

The number of

hearings DLS is required to conduct are too numerous to allow a
formal hearing at the agency level on each one.

Therefore,

judicial review de novo by the District Court assures the
affected party a fair opportunity to present evidence and be
heard.

The Utah Administrative Advisory Committee, responsible
for drafting the 1988 amendments to UAPA, indicated that the term
de novo, as used in S 63-46b-15, was to be given its standard
legal definition.

The committee stated in the Comments on the

Drafting and Interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act as follows:
The advisory committee considered defining
but chose not to define the following terms:
decision; de novo review; hearing and order.
The advisory committee concluded that these
terms have an accepted legal meaning in the
State of Utah and that any ambiguities ought
to be resolved within the judicial system,
(emphasis added). (See Addendum H).
The standard meaning of de novo literally means anew,
afresh or a second time.
1979).
Moffat.

Black's Law Dictionary 392 (5th ed.

In this case, such was the meaning given de novo by Judge
Judge Moffat stated "It is a trial de novo.

All new

evidence comes in and all old evidence comes in; to enable you to
put it in under the Utah Rules of Evidence even procedure comes
in.

It is truly not an appeal from a prior decision."

(T. 62).

Embodied in the term procedural due process is
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard and present any
claim or defense."

See In Re Nelson, 437 P.2d 1008 (N.M. 1968)

and Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

The very purpose of

the two-track system under UAPA is to allow an agency with a
large number of hearings to hold them at a more informal level,
with the added requirement that the affected party be given the
additional protection of de novo review at the District Court.
While an informal hearing does not allow the same constitutional
safeguards as a formal hearing, the informal hearing coupled with
-17-

a trial de novo at the District Court level ensures an individual
that his due process rights will be protected.

Even if we assume

Brinkerhoff was in some way prejudiced by not being informed in
the original notice that the administrative hearing was informal,
a de novo trial in the District Court would have provided a full
opportunity to conduct discovery and have an opportunity to be
heard and present any claim or defense.
The district court should only be allowed to set aside
the administrative decision for clear illegality, for abuse of
discretion, or if the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
By setting aside the decision based on a minor procedural
deficiency the District Court is not providing a trial de novo as
required by statute, but rather merely reviewing the record of
the administrative hearing.

De novo review allows the District

Court to cure minor deficiencies at the agency level and provide
an affected party his day in court.

To allow the District Court

to overturn the Department's ruling, based on a minor procedural
defect would result in raising technicalities over the merits and
in effect, do away with the informal hearing process.

No longer

would minor procedural deficiencies at the administrative level
be able to be cured by a trial de novo in the District Court. All
administrative hearings would have to be conducted formally,
requiring huge increases in number of employees and expenses for
agencies, such as DLS, that handle large numbers of hearings.
In a per curiam opinion, the United State Supreme Court
in Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25 (1971), addressed the
procedural due process afforded a Utah motorist under the Utah
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Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.

The Court affirmed the

decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Jennings v. Mahoney, 26
Utah 2d 128, 485 P.2d 1404 (1971), which held that a review of
the administrative action based on reports and other evidence
submitted was not a denial of due process.

In citing Bell v.

Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) the United States Supreme Court
stated that "'before the state may deprive [him] of his driver's
license and vehicle registration/* the State must provide "a
forum for the determination of the question" and a "meaningful
... 'hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'"
541-42.

Burson at

The Court continued as follows:
There is plainly a substantial question
whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face
affords the procedural due process required
by Bell v. Burson. This case does not,
however, require that we address that
question. The District Court in fact
afforded this appellant such procedural due
process. That court stayed the Director's
suspension order pending completion of
judicial review, and conducted a hearing at
which defendant was afforded the opportunity
to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses (emphasis added).
Such is the case in the instant fact situation.

Brinkerhoff was afforded at least the same due process
protections as in Jennings. He was given a "forum for the
determination of the question" and a "meaningful hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case" at the administrative
level.

In addition, the District Court stayed DLS'

suspension

of his license pending completion of judicial review in the
District Court.

The District Court then conducted a de novo

hearing in which Brinkerhoff was afforded the opportunity to
present any relevant evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

CONCLUSION
The forms used by DLS in the conduct of its
administrative hearing were adequately clear to give notice of
respondent's right to a hearing and met due process requirements.
In addition, DLS complied in all material respects with the
requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act by
publishing rules detailing the nature of its administrative
hearings and procedure and issuing a final order after the close
of the proceeding.

Respondent appeared and fully participated in

the administrative hearing and failed to timely object or request
conversion of the proceedings from informal to formal.

Based

upon his failure to act, respondent should be estopped from
asserting he was prejudiced by the informal nature of the
proceedings.

Finally, regardless of the procedure incorporated

at the administrative level, review by trial de novo in the
District Court assured respondent a full opportunity to conduct
discovery, present any relevant evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.

Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully

requests this court to reverse the District Court reinstatement
of respondent's drivers license and allow the 90 day suspension
by DLS to continue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Q-

day of November,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

LCHARD D. WYSS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant, was mailed, postage prepaid, to
William R. Russell, attorney for respondent, 8 East Broadway,
Suite 213, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this

November, 1989.
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ADDENDUM B

WILLIAM R RUSSELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
102 WEST 500 SOUTH SUITE 202
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101
(8011 322 5904

November 1,1988
Office of Driver License Services
4501 South 2700 West
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0560
Re: VerDon Brinkerhoff
D.L. No. 1434579
D.O.B. 8-5-38
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This letter is a forma] request for an administrative
hearing concerning the Notice of Intent to Suspend or Revoke
issued to the above-named individual on October 28,1988.
This
shall also serve as a formal demand for you to immediately return
his driver's license to him.
Please send me a complete copy of all materials which
you intend to admit into evidence or use in any way at the
administrative hearing.
Please notify me of the time and place for the hearing
requested herein. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincere]y,

W i l l i a m R.
cc:

Russell
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ROUTING RECORD
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Brinkerhoff
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I . 0AL£ ELTON. OEWTY COMMISSIONER

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY

Pursuant to your request for discovery, please find attached photocopies or
facsimiles of the following documents which are specific to the hearing
notification enclosed herein sent to the Department containing the following
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I v I DOT REPORT POEM
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TDese are the only documents on file with this Department at this tiae
specific to the aforementioned arrest with the exception of the Department of
Public Safety intoxilyzer test record of the intoxilyzer used (if any) as a
result of the arrest, ftese documents nay be reviewed at the Driver License
Office where the bearing i s t o b e h e l d o n t h e d a t e o f t h e hearing.

« n c a m x n g cne hearing notification sent to the attorney of record in that
November A, 1988

Dated

^ ^

Signature of Department Employee

3122k
OWVER UCENSE 0IVISI0N
Frtd Scfrwtnotman. Oirtctor

4501 Soutfi 2700 West - 3rd Floor Soutft
P.O. Boi 30560 - Salt Uke Citv. Utah S413M560
Ttltoftonr 8Q1-96W437

DOB:

8-5-38

DA:

10-26-88

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
NORMAN H BANGERHR GOVhRNOR

November 4 , 1988
Verdon C. Brinkerhoff
917 Park Row
S a l t Lake City, Ut 84105

FILE NO.:
D.O.B.:

JOHN 1 NILLSh N COMMISSION R
D DOUGLAS BODRfcRO DEPUTE COMMISSION'} R

1434579
8-5-38

Under Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, a hearing will be held by this Department
regarding the items checked below.
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Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Department's intention to suspend your driving privileges as a result of your
arrest for driving under the influence on
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Department's intention to revoke your driving privileges as a result of your
arrest for driving underthe influenceand alleged refusal tosubmit to
a chemical test on
We have received information that on
.you
were driving while your driving privilege was under revocation/suspension. Failure to appear at this hearing ^iay ^sult ii?exten^ion
of your revocation or suspttJisjon

Your hearing has been set as follows:
DATE:

November 21, 1988

TIME:

2:00 p .m.

PLACE:

o;

s
•4O

187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds) £ '•> £ 4 £ £ ^ f,
City>

538-8490"

^

'SSaSSSig-S

IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO APPEAR AT THE TIME INDICATED. YOU MUST NOTIFY THE
OFFICE AT LEAST FIVE (5) DAYS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED TIME. AND UPON
REASONABLE REQUEST. A NEW HEARING DATE MAY BE SCHEDULED.
William R. R u s s e l l
Attorney at Law
102 W. 500 So. #202
Salt Lake C i t y , Ut 84101

Very truly yours,

Phil G. Himmelberger, Bureau Chief
Driver Services
Encl: F i l e copy t o a t t n y .
pbj/114-1

.D

DOB:

8-5-38

D20591
CIT. #:
8813210
CASE*:
10-26-88
DA:

STATE O F UTAH
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY
NORMAN H BANGERTER. GOVERNOR

JOHN T. NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER
D. DOUGLAS SODRERO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

November 4, 1988
Chief Val Bess,
Officer Ferraro
South Salt Lake
44 East Oakland
Salt Lake City,

For
#L24U
Police
Ave.
Ut 84115
In reply, please refer to
FILE NO.: 1434579

RE:

Verdon C. Brinkerhoff

This Department has received a Report of Arrest for Driving Under the Influence regarding the
above named individual. It is requested that you appear for a hearing on this matter which has
been requested by the driver and which has been set as follows:

DATE:
TIME:
PLACE:

November 2 1 , 1988
2:0

° P- m -

187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds)
Salt Lake City, Ut
538-8490

It is important that you appear at this hearing. If you are unable to appear at the time
indicated, the hearing will be held and action will be taken accordingly.
Very truly yours,

:c:

Chief Val Bess, For
Officer Lewis
Officer Mattingly
South Salt Lake Police
44 East Oakland Ave.
Salt Lake City, Ut 84115

Phi, G

Himmelberger, Bureau Chief
Driver Services
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ADDENDUM C

Transcription of Official Tape
of the Hearing
November 21, 1988
H.O.: Bryan W. Call
Att.: William R. Russell
Driver: Verdon C. Brinkerhoff
DL # 1434579
D.O.B.: August 5, 1938

H.O.:

Today's date is November the 21, 1988.
hearing is 2:00 P.M.

Time set for the

It's an administrative suspension hearing

held for Don C. Brinkerhoff he is present.
is August 5, 1938.

His date of birth

Driver license number is 1434579.

Mr.

Brinkerhoff is being represented by William R. Russell.
of the arrest is October the 26, 1988.
is Fairgrounds Driver License Office.
Call.

Date

Location of the hearing
Hearing Officer is Bryan

Arresting Officer is Sergeant Ferraro of the South Salt

Lake City Police Department.

Witness Officer, Officer Lewis,

also of the South Salt Lake City Police Department.

This

hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in
accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Utah
Code Annotated 41-2-130, following his arrest for driving while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of
alcohol and drugs.

The issues to be determined are:

If the

peace officer had grounds to believe the driver had been in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol and/or drugs, was requested to take a chemical test,
was warned of the potential consequences of taking the test,
and test results if any.

All formalities required in court

proceedings need not be used in this hearing.

However, the Division shall substantially comply with the
fundamental rules of due process.

Sworn testimony will be

taken and the parties may have witnesses testify.

The driver

may testify and may cross examine others who testify.

If the

license is suspended the driver has the right within 30 days,
to petition the proper court for an appeal hearing.

At this

time I will swear in those who are going to testify.
Officers will stand.

Both

You going to have your client testify?

Att.:

Yes.

H.O.:

Mr. Brinkerhoff will you also stand and raise your right hand?
Do you each of you swear to tell the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you, God?

Officer:

I do.

Witness:

I do.

Driver:

I do.

H.O.:

Thank you.

For the record all have answered affirmatively.

Sergeant Ferraro could you identify those documents for the
record, please.
Officer:

This is the DUI report I filled out on Mr. Brinkerhoff on the
26th of October.

H.O.:

Thank you.

The following documents and information are part of

the records for this hearing.

The Officerfs report submitted

in compliance with Utah Code Annotated 41-2-130.

Notice and

citation served by the officer of the Department's intent to
suspend, and information on how to receive a hearing by the
Department.

Hearing request made within ten days.

machine record of test results.
instruments.

Test

Operational checklist of test

Department of Public Safety affidavit that

indicates the breath testing instrument was check according to
Department Standards.

Two affidavits being dated October 21st

and November the 2nd of 1988.

At this time Sergeant Ferraro

would you give us your testimony please.
Officer:

Yes.

Ah . . .

Att.:

Excuse me, Mr. Call could I ask if this is being conducted as a
formal/informal at this time?

H.O.:

As a informal hearing.

Att.:

Informal?

H.O.:

Yes.

Officer:

Ah, we were dispatched to an accident about 2695 South 300
West.

Okay, Officer.

That was at ah, 1935 hours on the 26th of October.

Ah,

upon arrival myself and Officer Lewis which were in separate
vehicles.

Officer Lewis handled the accident and during the

accident investigation it was determined that Mr. Brinkerhoff
had had some alcohol to drink.
part of this accident.

Ah, I asked, I handled the DUI

And we did smell alcohol on the ah, Mr.

Brinkerhoff's breath and I asked him if he had any alcohol to
drink, he told me that he had only one beer he also told me
that he had taken a Valium after work.

Ah, I gave him field

sobriety tests, I gave him five field sobriety tests which he
was unable to do.

At that time I did place him under arrest

for driving under the Influence of alcohol or drugs.

After

placing him under arrest for that I did transport him to the
South Salt Lake Police Station where he was read the .08
admonition.

And at that time he did submit to a chemical test.

He was requested to take a breath test and was given a breath
test by Officer Warner who was unable to be here today.

The

results of that breath test was a .105.
Att.:

I'll object to that response on the grounds that it is not from
the Officer'8 observation and ask that it be stricken.

Officer:

I may also add I was present during the breath test and watched
it being administered.

The test was administered by Officer

Warner who followed the operational check list and the machine
was found to be functioning correct.
H.O.:

How did you determine that Mr. Brinkerhoff was ah, had been
driving or was in actual physical control of the vehicle.

Officer:

Ah, the witness in the, the other party that was involved in
the accident also he admitted to me that he was driving the
vehicle.

H.O.:

You said you gave five field sobriety tests, would you please
tell me what they were and how he performed on those?

Officer:

I gave him, the first test was an alphabet test he said that
ah, very slow.

I requested him to say A through Z.

through S then stopped and went W through Z.

He did A

Next test was the

finger count test I had him count his fingers with his thumb 1
to 4 then 4 to 1, I asked him to do that test twice.
fingers were shaky

Ah, his

and he did not complete that test, he

couldn't get his fingers in sequence with the numbers.

The

third test was the heel to toe test, I requested him to walk
nine steps out and nine steps return.

His balance was unsteady

during that test, he stumbled on step 7 out, he stumbled on his
turn, and he stumbled on returns 3 and 4 steps.

The fourth

test was a finger to nose test ah, during this test his balance
was unsteady.

I requested him to touch his nose with his right

index finger, he did touch the tip with that.

I asked him to

do his left, he touched under his nose with his left.

I asked

him his left and right again which he did touch the tip at each
time.

The five, number five test was the nystagmus gaze, which

I noted no smooth pursuit and there was 45 degree and maximum
deviation eye jerking.
H.O.:

You stated you were present when the breath test was
administered?

Officer:

Yes.

H.O.:

Do you know if Officer Warner is certified to operate the
machine?

Officer:

Yes, he is.

H.O.:

And how do you know that?

Officer:

Ah, my certification expired a couple of months ago so I had to
have him come in and perform the test for me, since he does
have a current certification.

H.O.:

Counselor would you like to question this Officer?

Att.:

Uh huh.

How do you know his is current, his certification,

Sergeant?
Officer:

Well, in part of the training ah, in the training division
there's two Sergeants that handle that.

And I know because of

that, that he is current on his certification, that is a
mandatory thing within our Department that they stay certified.
Att.:

When did he get certified?

Officer:

I don't have the dates with me.

Att.:

When does he, when does the certification run?

Officer:

I don't have the dates with me.

Att.:

But you feel that he is certified at the time of this.

Officer:

Yes, all the Department was certified on the same day.

I was

out of town at the last certification.

It was just last year

that they were certified.
Att.:

Ahem, did you transport Mr. Brinkerhoff from the scene?

Officer:

Yes I did.

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

Yes, I was.

Att.:

Were you the only other person, other than Mr. Brinkerhoff in

Were you an only person, were you in a police cruiser.

that cruiser?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Ahem, you said that you got a dispatch at 1935 Is that

stating your testimony correctly Sergeant?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

How did you know that?

Ah, I can't find it right here on the

form except the citation is that where you are getting your
information?
Officer:

That's the time dispatch gave me that she dispatched this . .

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

That would be 7:35.

Att.:

Uh huh.

The citation, the military time . . .

Is that, is that what you are referring to as far as

your recollection as to the time of dispatch?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Do you have a notation in your report as to when you

arrived on the scene?
Officer:

Ah, yeah, let me get the accident report here.

1937 see

(inaudible).
Att.:

Uh hum.

Sergeant directing your attention to page two of the

standarized report form at the very top of that is the field
sobriety test you referred to.

Ahem, on the bottom of that

section under field sobriety test it says unable to do test.
Ah, did you mean one test, or all of the tests or what were you
speaking of specifically there Sergeant?
Officer:

Well, all of his tests he was unable to perform satisfactorily.

Att.:

Officer, you don't mean that he was unable to attempt them,
just that he didn't do them satisfactorily is that . . .

Officer:

Correct.

Att.:

Okay.

Is there any special significance do you use the

parenthesis that are found in there for any special reason
Sergeant?
Officer:

Yes.

The way I do it is I write down the test I gave and then

in parenthesis I write what I asked them to do . . .
Att.:

Uh huh.

Officer:

. . .then I put what they did do.

Att.:

Specifically like a 9/9 that would mean that you instructed him
to do nine up turn around and do nine back.

Is that what that

would mean to you?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

And the parenthesis around the A to Z said do the whole
alphabet and so forth.

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Ahem, on the finger count you've got 1-4-4-1 twice in

parenthesis, is that your instructions Sergeant?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

So you did instruct him and did you, did you instruct

him to do a 1-4-4-1?

Finger count?

Officer:

Yes, 1 to 4 and then 4 to 1.

Att.:

Oh.

Oh, okay so it's not 1-4-4-1 . . .

It f s . . .

Officer:

No.

Att.:

It's 1-2-3-4 . . .

Officer:

It's 1 to 4 and then 4 to 1.

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

Right.

Att.:

Then 4-3-2-1 and you instructed him to do that twice is that

So you ascend, go up in numbers 1-2-3-4.

correct?

And you demonstrated that to him is that correct?

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Is that right?

Okay.

Ahem, test number four finger to nose

ah, in the parenthesis again Sergeant it says right, left,
left, right.

And that was both demo, both explained and

demonstrated

in that order is that correct?

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

A right two left

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

and then right.

Now he did hit his tip three out of four times, is that

right?
Officer:

Yes, sir.

Att.:

And he did follow those instructions as far as the sequence of
left and right, is that correct?

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Ah, Sergeant at the time that you administered the gaze

nystagmus test to Mr. Brinkerhoff were his glasses on or off?
Officer:

Ah, I had him remove them, his glasses.

Att.:

You had him remove his glasses.

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Where was this test performed Sergeant?

Officer:

I believe they were in the parking lot of the company at 2695

South 300 West.
Att.:

Uh hum.

Where did he put his glasses do you remember?

Officer:

I believe he just held them, to the best of my ability.

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

My recollection.

Att.:

Okay.

Did you have Mr. Brinkerhoff under observation from the

time you arrived at the scene until the time of the intoxilyzer
test was given?
Officer:

Well, on and off.

Ah, I was giving damage release stickers and

Att.:

Uh huh.

Officer:

stuff like that but . . .

Att.:

Sergeant, specifically in reference to my last question, from
the time that he entered your police cruiser under arrest,
until the time that the test was given, were you observing him
the whole time?

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

Yes, he was.

Att.:

Upon arrest?

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Was he handcuffed at times?

And ah, when you took him in to have the intoxilyzer

test administered you stated that Officer Warner, was he at the
station Sergeant?
Officer:

I don't remember whether he was in there or I called him.

Att.:

Okay.

Ahem, did you go anywhere after the time that you got to

the station ah, until Officer Warner administered the test?
Officer:

Ah, yeah, I believe I went into dispatch a couple of times

after Officer Warner got there and was with Mr. Brinkerhoff.
Att.:

Okay.

And how long before the test would that have been last

time that you went into dispatch?
Officer:

Ah, I don't really remember I was in and out so . . .

Att.:

Let me ask you this ah, . . .

Officer:

(inaudible) was why Officer Warner getting the test prepared I
was doing a couple of other things like getting his information
from dispatch and that so . . .

Att.:

You were in another room?

Officer:

Yeah.

Att.:

Okay.

Now, I'm sorry Sergeant you are a lot more familiar with

the South Salt Lake complex than I am.

Ah, the court is down

in the basement, right?
Officer:

The City Hall . . .

Att.:

Yes, uh huh.

Officer:

The Police Station is separate in a separate building.

Att.:

Where is it?

Officer:

It's just west of the main complex.

Att.:

Oh it's just down that little street that runs parallel to the

Sergeant.

freeway. . .
Officer:

Yeah . . .

Att.:

I see.

Officer:

By the tennis courts there . . .

Att.:

Right, by the park.

Okay.

So ah, dispatch is in a separate

area from the area, from the area where you keep the
intoxilyzer machine, is that right?
Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Officer:

A couple of rooms apart?

Att.:

Alright.

Ahem, Sergeant do you recall Mr. Brinkerhoff asking

you if he could get a drink of water when he got to the
station?
Officer:

Urn, no I don't recall.

Att.:

You don't recall one way or another whether he did or not?

Officer:

No, no.

Att.:

Ahem, what was Mr. Brinkerhoff's general demeanor Sergeant, was
he belligerent, combative, ah, aggressive . . .

Officer:

No he was, no he was very cooperative.

Att.:

Did he make any statements to you as to why the police were
called?

To the accident, whether he initiated that call or the

other driver?
Officer:

No.

I don't know who called, Officer Lewis can answer that, I

don't know who was the complainant.
Att.:

Alright.

Another question about the dispatch Sergeant, sorry

to skip around so much.

You say that you got a dispatch, you

were dispatched at 1935 military time.
Officer:

Uh hum.

Att.:

Now that is the actual time that your dispatcher radios to you
that there is an accident, 10:50, right?

Officer:

That's when she gets a call, she stamps a card when the call
comes in.

Att.:

When she receives the call is the 1935 that we have been
talking about, is that right?

Officer:

Uh hum.

Att.:

And you, from the accident report have said that you arrived on
the scene at 1937 military time.

Officer:

Right.

Att.:

Just two minutes between when she, when according to
procedures

she would have received the call and stamped it in

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Just two minutes, okay?

Was there anybody in the vehicle with

Mr. Brinkerhoff?
Officer:

Yes, there was.

Att.:

Could you describe that passenger real briefly?

H.O.:

Counselor, I don't believe that has any pertinence to this
hearing.

Att.:

He was a witness to the thing.
he made.

H.O.:

I want to know what statements

I think it's pertinent.

I don't see that there is any pertinence as to what a passenger
had to do with this case.

Att.:

As to what another person said, or observed, or what they did?

H.O.:

Do you have any of those witnesses here?

Att.:

No.

H.O.:

Then I don't see any pertinence in going into the involvement
in the case then.

Att.:

So your telling me I can't ask the question?

H.O.:

Yeah, I won't allow that testimony to be entered on the record.

Att.:

Okay.

Sergeant, may I refer your attention to no, excuse me, I

will withdraw that.

Sergeant, do you recall any statement by

Mr. Brinkerhoff that he had, had an ulcer condition?
Officer:

I don't remember anything about ulcers.
a heart and blood pressure problem.

Att.:

Uh hum.

He did tell me he had

Officer:

Unless, (inaudible) he did have an ulcer I have it written on
the ah, third page back.

At the time I asked him the questions

he told me he had ulcers also.
Att.:

I see on the interview portion of the ah, . . .

Officer:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Did ah, you ask him if he had any regurgitation or

belching problems as a result of his ulcer?
Officer:

No I didn't.

Att.:

Okay.

That's all I have.

H.O.:

Okay.

Officer Lewis do you want to give us your testimony

please?
Witness:

Okay, I was dispatched to the scene on an accident.
ah, to begin the investigation at 1935.

I arrived

Ah, upon beginning the

investigation I, standard procedures is to hand out driver
exchange forms and driver statement forms.

Ahem, I requested,

the vehicles were still out in the 300 West at the time I
arrived.

I instructed the drivers to move the vehicles.

Mr.

Brinkerhoff did move his vehicle into the parking lot at 29,
correction, 2695 South 300 West parking lot.

Ah, while I was

giving the ah, forms to Mr. Brinkerhoff I did smell an odor of
alcohol upon his person at the time.

Ah, then I proceeded to

do, begin my investigation of the accident.

The only other

time I had contact with Mr. Brinkerhoff was when he was under
arrest and sitting in the police car of Sergeant Ferraro.

Ah,

I observed him breathing deep, he looked like he was
hyperventilating.
H.O.:

I don't have any questions of Officer Lewis, do you counsel?

Att.:

I have nothing.

H.O.:

Okay.

Are you going to have your client testify?

Att.:

Yes, I am.

H.O.:

If you want to proceed with that.

Att.:

Just, just a moment I have to think whether

I am or not.

Can

I have just one minute with my client?
H.O.:

Sure, we'll go off the record while you step out.

Att.:

Thank you.

H.O.:

We are back on record now.

Counsel are you going to have your

client testify?
Att.:

Yes.

He will testify.

Would you state your name please?

Driver:

Ah, Verdon C. Brinkerhoff.

Att.:

Uh huh.

Don, you've heard the testimony of the two Officers

about the evening of the 26th of October, haven't you?
Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

Don would you briefly explain to the hearing examiner

ah, generally what happened that day?
Driver:

Alright.

Towards the end of work.

Ah, as I stayed some after work to complete a project

I was working on.

I am also taking a college refresher course

so I completed my lesson ah, lessons for that course and I also
completed my monthly bills, I had them in that little red bag
that . . .
Att.:

What time do you get off work, Don?

Driver:

4:00 o'clock.

Att.:

And you stayed until when?

Driver:

When I left the area it was ah, little after six, I'd say six
fifteen or twenty.

Att.:

By the area, what do you mean, Don?

Driver:

I am talking about the Magna ah, . . .

Att.:

Where do you work?

Driver:

80, 41st West, or 41st South and 8400 West.

Att.:

Did you have plans for that evening Don, and if so what were
they?

Driver:

Ah, previously I'd plan to meet a fellow by the name of Kimble
Vance Ett at the Towne and Country.

But we normally meet and

play pool one time a week.
Att.:

What is the location of the Towne and Country, Don?

Driver:

It's 33 South and just off 3rd West, just East of it some.

Att.:

Uh hum.

Did you in fact go to the Towne and Country that

evening, Don?
Driver:

I, I stopped to see if he was still there, yes.

Att.:

Best recollection of when you left your place of employment,
Don.

Driver:

Oh, twenty after six.

Att.:

Twenty after six P.M.

Driver:

P.M.

Att.:

Uh hum.

Your best recollection or estimate as to when you got

to the Towne and Country.
Driver:

Approximately quarter to seven.

Att.:

Uh hum.

Ah, Don did you have anything to drink in the Towne

and Country?
Driver:

Yes, I did.

I ordered, I ordered one beer.

Att.:

Did you drink that?

Driver:

Yes, I did.

Att.:

What was it in a mug, glass, schooner . . .

Driver:

It was in a schooner.

Att.:

Uh huh.

Driver:

(Inaudible)

Att.:

About how tall?

Driver:

Oh I think it is the eight ounce glass.

Att.:

Alright.

Driver:

Whatever that is.

Att.:

Ah, did you have any more beer after that?

Driver:

Ah, thinking back I was talking to a fellow who was sitting
adjacent to me.

He did refill my glass ah, not refill it

totally but he did have some, he had a pitcher.
Att.:

Uh huh.

And how many times did he do that, Don?

Driver:

He did that twice ah, once ah, when we were talking and I went
to the restroom before leaving and he filled it just before I
left.

Att.:

Okay.

So you canft be exactly sure how many full glasses you

had to . . .
Driver:

I had . . .

Att.:

With complete precision?

What is your best estimate as to how

many total . . .
Driver:

I, I ordered one and he put, he refilled it and when I say
refill it was not totally empty at the time.

Att.:

Uh huh.

How long do you think you spent in the Towne and

Country, Don.
Driver:

Ah, maybe 45 minutes or at approximately 7:30 I left . . .

Att.:

Did you have any, . .

Driver:

Within 5 minutes . . .

Att.:

Did you have any hard liquor at that time?

Driver:

No.

Att.:

Okay.

Don ah, how was it that you are so conscious about how

much you drink?
Driver:

I used to be a very heavy drinker and I, in 19 I lost my wife,
she died.

My business ah, through the 1979, 82 time frame I

was drinking very heavily, mostly at home.
Att.:

When did that stop Don?

Driver:

In the middle of the year 1982, I got a DUI in 1982

Att.:

Uh hum.

Driver:

And for the two years I attended the Utah Alcoholism
Foundation.

Then the . . .

Att.:

Do you limit yourself since then Don?

Driver:

I go out one day a week.

Att.:

Do you go out and drink as much as you want on that day?

Driver:

No, I limit it to two drinks.

Att.:

Okay.

I never buy more than two drinks.

Don ah, in the testimony of the Sergeants as well as

reported, it states here that you complained of an ulcer
problem.

What is the extent of the ulcer problem?

Driver:

I have duodenum ulcers, I have peptic ulcers.

Att.:

Does that cause, have any physical manifestations other than
the discomfort?

Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

What are those.

Driver:

I have severe gas problems when I drink.

Att.:

You mean gas, do you mean like vilification or

Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

You mean ah . . .

Driver:

I belch ah, I'm not supposed to drink at all on an empty
stomach.

Att.:

Uh huh.

Did you have any belching problem that evening?

Driver:

Yes, I did.

Att.:

Ah, when?

Driver:

I think from the ah, time I left the club on.

Att.:

Uh huh.

Ah, on the examination, or on the statement of the

Sergeant that you just heard Don, he stated that there was a
pause in your A,B,C's . . .
Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

Do you have any explanation

Driver:

Yes.

for that, Don?

I was belching between the, on the two letters, I said

them under my breath my (inaudible) was W,X,Z.
Att.:

Don, how long do you figure.

First of all let me ask you this,

do you remember another Officer, not Officer Lewis, not
Sergeant Ferraro, but another Officer came in and administered
an intoxilyzer test to you?
Driver:

Yes, I do.

Att.:

Now he isn't either one of these two gentleman here today is he?

Driver:

No.

Att.:

How long was he in your presence Don, by that I mean you could
see him in the same room?

Driver:

He was there maybe 10 minutes.

Att.:

That's fine.

Okay.

I'm ah . . .

Ahem, Don would you ah, briefly explain

and skip as much irrelevant detail as you can, just explain to
the Hearing Examiner what happened when you left the Towne and
Country Bar.
Driver:

As I was leaving a fellow who later identified himself as a
Alex Sandaval . . .

Att.:

Uh huh.

Driver:

Asked if he could ride with me, or if I would give him a ride

to 17th South.
13th East.

That was not my route home, I take the I 80 to

But ah, I decided I'd give him a ride.

Ah, we left

directly . . .
Att.:

Was it dark, was it light, was it (inaudible). . .

Driver:

In front of the Towne and Country it was very dark and I had to
get on to, to get on third West I had to go through pot holes
and a barricade which were not well lit at all.

Att.:

Ah . . .

Do you believe that your head lights were on or off, at that
time?

Driver:

I know that they were on . . .

Att.:

Okay . . .

Driver:

There is no question.

Att.:

And ah, then you proceeded North on Third West, is that correct?

Driver:

Yes, that's right.

Att.:

Would you describe the incidence leading right up to the
accident.

Driver:

We drove ah, North on ah, Third West and ah, approximately two
minutes or less later I was traveling through the 27th South
intersection.

And just as I had gone through the intersection

a fellow who later I found out that his name was Mr.
(inaudible) or however it is pronounced, came shooting across
the curb into the northbound lanes and braked when he saw my
headlights, when he hit his car.

At the same time almost, I

instantly, I hit my brakes as the skid marks will show, or
probably ah, evidence.

And just before impact in his side door

which we were sliding towards, I released the brakes slightly
so I could get some rolling friction.

But my front tires and I

was able to negotiate enough of a turn in the vehicle that our

vehicles collided.

Front at the front passenger side of my car

and front of the front wheel drivers side of the other car.
Att.:

Do you have any indication that, that person saw your vehicle
approaching before impact, Don?

Driver:

He wasn't even looking as he came across the curb.

He turned

and stared at us as my headlights lighted up his whole
vehicle.
Att.:

Uh huh.

He had a shocked, stunned look on his face.
At any time from the time you left the Towne and

Country parking lot until the collision happened were you
headlights off?
Driver:

Not at anytime.

Att.:

Okay.

Don, I'm going to ask you what I marked as exhibit A and

ask if you can identify that please.
Driver:

Yes, this is a sketch I made at the scene ah, ah, approximately
the positions of the two vehicles as I was going through the
intersection.

Approximately the position I was in when I, the

front of his car started to immerge ah, across the curb.

And

the final resting position after the front ends of the two
vehicles had come to ah, stop.
Att.:

Don, did you personally prepare that?

I mean make these marks

and these other indications?
Driver:

Yes, I did.

Att.:

Did you base that upon your recollection?

Driver:

I based that on my recollection and I also went down and
counted the trees and so on.

Att.:

Uh huh.

Did you base this on any other persons recollection?

Driver:

No.

Att.:

So this is made up from, as you just testified, from your, that

evening plus subsequent observations plus subsequent
observations . . .
Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

Okay.

We offer this as an exhibit on behalf of Mr. Brinkerhoff

showing the accident area.
H.O.:

Okay.

I will accept that in the record.

Att.:

Don, just briefly to clean up, there is obstruction there where
the vehicle came out . . .

H.O.:

Excuse me, just for clarification, could I have you mark a
North direction on there so there isn't any question.

Driver:

Let me, excuse me, do that right here now.

H.O.:

Okay.

Driver:

That's North.

H.O.:

Okay.

Att.:

Don ah, for clarification are there any obstructions in the
area where the vehicle was pulling out of as it relates to your
line of sight approaching (inaudible) direction?

Driver:

Yes.

There were a number of telephone poles.

small pine trees.
cottonwood tree.

There were some

There was eight shade trees and one large
In addition there were other cars in that

parking lot when I pulled in.

I couldn't tell you if there

were any parked in the stalls between the ah, intersection and
the driveway when the accident occurred, because I was not
looking in the parking lot at that time.

And it was some

minutes, quite a few minutes later before we pulled in the
parking lot.
Att.:

Uh huh.

When was the first time that this other driver said

something about your headlights not being on?

Driver:

That was after I refused to move the vehicle, my vehicle along
with his into the parking lot.

Att.:

You insisted that they stay where they were on the roadway?

Driver:

Stay where they were until the police arrived.

Att.:

Now was that before he went to call the police or after, that
he made a statement about your headlights?

Driver:

He I, I think he was arguing with Mr. Sandaval about this
before he went to make the telephone call.
concoursly conversation.

He, I had a very

He asked me if we would pull those

cars in and I said not until the police come.

And that was

about all we had to say to each other.
Att.:

Mr. Brinkerhoff, could you feel the affects of the beer when
you pulled out of the Towne and Country lot?

Driver:

Not at all.

Att.:

Did you feel the affects of the beer as you were driving up
third West just before the collision?

Driver:

Not at all.

Att.:

Did you feel the affects of the beer anytime that evening?

Driver:

Yes.

Att.:

When was the first time you felt the affects of the beer?

Driver:

I started to feel affects as ah, ah, as we were finishing the
forms in the parking lot.

About that time.

Att.:

About how long was that after the collision . . .

Driver:

(inaudible) 40 minutes.

Att.:

30 or 40 minutes.

Okay.

Ah, Don, do you have an estimate as

to what your speed was when you cleared the 27th South
intersection.
Driver:

35 miles an hour.

I looked at my instrument panel just prior

to ah, ah, entering the intersection.
Att.:

Uh huh.

Ah, did you see this vehicle stop Don, the other

vehicle?
Driver:

It didn't even hesitate.

Att.:

Were it's lights on?

Driver:

I, they weren't when we stopped.
off.

Att.:

He could have turned them

I don't know that.

Don, ah, immediately before you took the intoxilyzer test had
you, did you exchange any belching that you referred to?

Driver:

Yes, and I asked Sergeant Ferraro if I could get a drink of
water. Aand he said ah, not until after the breath test.

And I

said well that's fair.
Att.:

Okay.

Driver:

I felt a lot of stomach discomfort at the time.

Att.:

Alright.

How long does it normally take you to get home from

the Towne and Country Don, do you have any idea?
Driver:

Yes.

Ah, I drove the route afterwards down to the Towne and

Country from my home and it took 11 minutes.

I came back the

route I would have gone if I would have took Mr. Sandaval and
dropped him off at 17th South, and that was a little over 15
minutes.
Att.:

Uh huh.

That's all I have.

H.O.:

Do you have any closing statements you would like to make?

Att.:

Yes.

The ah, largest and most obvious problem that we have got

here, first of all is the Baker Rule.

Ah, we have no legal

residual evidence that the Baker Rule was followed.

Ah, to the

contrary, the undisputed testimony on the record is that Mr.
Brlnkerhoff was in fact suffering from ah, if not regurgitation

at least some belching at the time, due to his Peptic and
Duodenal ulcer condition.

Ah, we would assert that without the

showing that the Baker rule was followed ah, that the test is
inadmissible and cannot be considered as part of the record.
Ah, further related issue is now evidence ah, that we have
before us that shows that the Officer who administered the test
was certified.
of that.

I understand that Sergeant Ferraro is in charge

And ah, that he may very well know, but he doesn't

know the expiration date of the thing.

Ah, we don't know if

the Officer was certified on that night.

But, that is a

subsidiary to the Baker Rule problem that we've got on this
case.

Ah, there is no showing that any person observed Mr.

Brinkerhoff for the 20 minute continuous period.

In fact, the

uncontrovertid evidence in front of the examiner here today is
that no one observed him for a continuous 20 minute period
before that time.

My client testified that the observation was

for a ten minute period ah, that ah, Officer, Sergeant Ferraro
as his testimony indicates was doing other things at that
time.

We have no showing of Baker Rule.

Ah, our primary

factual contingent is that we've got ah, an intoxilyzer result
that shows .10.

Mr. Brinkerhoff is just a few minutes away

from consuming his last beer ah, and what we've got here is a
blood alcohol level.
very clear here.

I would ask ah, excuse me I'm not being

We've asked the examiner take judicial notice

of the Widmark formula.

And the ah, little cards that are

promulgated by this division that show that the ah, time that
it takes to simulate alcohol into the system is more than a
period of just five minutes or so.

That ah, what we've got

here is Mr. Brinkerhoff operating a vehicle ah, very safely
avoiding a complete side slam of this vehicle that comes on to
the road ah, and nearly avoiding an accident, just bareley
clipping the front of it.

Would indicate that he was not

intoxicated at that point, due to the response time that he
nearly avoided the accident completely.

And that the other

driver was at fault. Ah, what we are submitting to this ah,
this Hearing Examiner is the proposition that Mr. Brinkerhoff
while he was operating that vehicle was under the .08 limit.
That the accident was not his fault and therefore he was not
driving under the influence to a degree which impaired his
ability to drive safely.

After ah, the Officers show up and

they do the necessary paperwork, and it takes awhile to get the
information from the drivers.

His blood alcohol level was

climbing during that period and finally exceeded .08, and then
topped out some about an hour after the collision happened at a
.10.

We submit that there is not a showing that he was not

under the influence at the time he operated that vehicle.

Only

that it was sometime subsequent that his blood alcohol level
exceeded the legal Perse limit of .08.

Other than the Baker

Rule the intervening intoxication I do have ah, a couple of
statements I need to make for the purpose of the record.

That

is that this Perse action should be dismissed on the grounds
that the Division has not complied with the Administrative
Procedures

Act in the following respects.

First of all, the

first time that we received notice that this was a formal or
informal hearing was when Mr. Call himself indicated that this
was an informal hearing.

As provided ah, by in section 63-46

B-3 of the Utah Code any agency action for an Admin, for a
judicated proceeding must be initiated by a notice which
contains the following information.

Most notably of which is,

and I will quote from the statute that the ah, judicative
agency notice must be signed and it says signed, not stamped by
the presiding Officer of the Division.

Ah, the other

requirements have been met with the exception that under
(inaudible) 2 A b or 5 ah, there is no statement in the notice
to whether the injudicated proceeding is to be conducted
informally according to certain sections, or formally according
to other sections.

Ah, with those two deficiencies ah, we

believe that the notice is not sufficient under that
Administrative Procedures

Act and therefore, ah, the results

should be no action by the Division.

Also, I didn't say this,

there is no signature on the notice as well as not indicating
whether
H.O.:

Okay.

it is formal or informal.

We will complete the hearing and you will be advised by

mail as the results of the hearing.
Att.:

On that submit it.

Thanks.

TRANSCRIPTION CERTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Departmental Hearing of the matter of
State of Utah versus Verdon C. Brinkerhoff, File Number 1434579 was
electronically recorded by the Driver License Division.
That such recording was transcribed by me into typewriting; and
that a true and correct transcription of said recording, to the best of
my knowledge, is set forth in the foregoing pages.

WITNESS MY HAND this 19th day of December 1988.

*y

< ^ , (, J/r.^
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION

ADDENDUM D

//</-/ 4

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
• :•

• -L.. U ) l

A l J ! I H' I ' b i : r>,

Ann 41-2-130)
Date of
Hearing

Time Set
For Hearing

Hearing Officer

Name and Address of Driver

iJGF\
Name and Address of Attorney

'

^7 / ^

Arresting Officer

l, _n/)t<l)

$f[,
!

'^7

LL

££%?

&

42*22-^

'

Date of Birth

?rffzrr&
Agency

PL Number __

Witness

Date of Arrest

Witness

Witness

Location of Hearing

Witness

OPENING STATEMENT
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in accordance with the Utah Adn itnisti ative Pi ocedures Act and
Utah Code Ann 41 -2-130. following his'her arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combination of alcohol and drugs The issue to be determined are: if the peace officer had grounds to believe the driver had been
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol andor drugs, was requested to take a chemical
test,, was warned of the potential consequences of taking the test, and was informed of the test results if any,,
All formalities required n i coui ! pi oceedn lgs need i lot be used in this I seam ig„ f-uw*
comply with the fundamental rules of due process Sworn testimony will be taken anc u.v K«.uco m a ; nave
testify.. The driver may testify and may cross examine others who testify.

«UMCDOCD

If the license is suspended the driver has the right will lin 30 H: *\" to petition the proper court for an appeal hearing.
"1 1 tose testifj in ig w Ml b e si * 'Oi i i ar

I

The following documents and infoi mation are par t of the records foi this hearing:
Yes

No

V

D

8

The officer's report submitted in compliance with Utah Code Ann 41 -2-130
Notice and citation served by the officer of the Departmeni,,:*!. mt^m io
to receive a hearing by the Department.

D
D
D

Hearing request made within ten days.
1 est r i lachine record of test results, if any,.
Operational checklist of test instrument.

QU'-|>"

d ai'i'i '

Yes
p.

No
D

B

D

Department of Public Safety affidavit that indicates the breath testing instrument was check according to
Department Standards (41-6-44.3 UCA)
Other (le Documents and;or information received in behalf of the friver and/or other evidence received
which is made official record for the purpose of this heading).
^

Explain feci}/SAT <rf<afrzHr[ ky

ffic &r//>£*rJisv

TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED
1.

Sworn testimony of officer.
a Following are the facts and conclusions presented by the peace officer leading the peace officer to believe the
party had been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug or a combination of alcohol and any drug

Mr ^mteffofi

arfmtiteJ beih* foe t/'h/*/: tfe ha J

b. The driver was placed under arrest:
c

No

D

Yes

S

Charge(s)

&L4T,

The driver was advised prior to the chemical test that test results could result in suspension of his/her driving
privilege No D
Yes &

d. Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so:

No

•

Yes

B

e Department procedure and rules were followed by the peace officer in the administration of the chemical
test No D
Yes £9
e(1) Evidence and or information received indicating the test machine was

fi

was not

D

properly working:

e(2) The driver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer which showed a reliable test result of

it OS

%

?. Testimony by witness officer or other witness(es): Name: _jL£iM£>

Substance of testimony or evidence by driver or witness(es) Name

Jspnfef/w/

(Tic fim&ddr desc-rtkej M& a^/^/p/'

a/id

4

fWr

te

fre

^/?^ sfa£?J

//>fa#fa*r >**&?

Substance of statement and or questions by driver's legal counsel

9tt?/J fesh, /sfax'/y*^ ^ ^
Counsel anfues Maf

fAf

*#ct &fe^

rvfe

/SfArr ra/e~ usas ,

lhc*t dtp/ess ldrr/>?f /s cerfi&f^ $& P>& /sf&fr/y*&'
+est skw^
^& &!rAi//&krf tf/s c/wf
Aad^W/£
THe htfihce <s>F~fA& fe»wf /s ^fety/*^

'*/?** y^^

PRESIDING OFFICERS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW:
A The peace officer had reason to believe that the driver had / \ ]
and was arrested for the same
B The driver was

had not

D

violated Utah Code Ann 41-6-44

B

was not

D

placed under arrest for D U I.

C The driver was IB

was not

D

advised of the possible revocation/suspension of his/her driving privilege

D The chemical test was

fi

was not

D

administered by an officer certified to do so

E Proper procedures and standards were 3
were not
the test machine to be reliable, with the results of

D

followed by the peace officer to insure the operation of
%

F Department of Public Safety affidavit indicated the breath testing instrument used was J$
and in proper working order accodnng to Department Standards (UCA 41-6-44 3)

was not

D

reliable

G. All procedures and requirements were (3 werenot D followed by the reporting officer pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
41-2-130. (Explain what procedures were not followed, if any):

H. Officer did 8 did not D
Reasons for non-appearance:

appear.

I. Additional findings of fact not covered above:

CONCLUSIONS:
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE STATUTORY
PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN 41-2-130
WERE B WERENOT D PROVIDED IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS RENDERED:
E

To suspend the driving
privilege by authority
of Utah Code Ann. 41 -2-130.

Q

Take No Action:
Explain:

Comments by Presiding Officer:

Presiding Officer:
FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ONLY

ADDENDUM E

STATE OF UTAH

10-26-88
DOB: 08-05-38

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
NORMAN M BANGERTER.

GOVERNOR
0

JOHN T

NIELSEN

COMMISSIONER

DOUGLAS BODRERO

DEPUTY

COMMISSIONER

DEPUTY

COMMISSIONER

L

VERDON C BRINKERHOFF
917 PARK ROW
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84105

DALE ELTON

ORDER OF SUSPENSION
FILE NUMBER 001434579

BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 25 NOVEMBER 1988.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU.
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-130 AND THAT
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.F
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW).
F
£

, 6

u.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE r
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $50.00 FEE FOLLO$IN£
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE;
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $2$*00
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE *; ~
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED gOR;
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
Q i
ill

£

-'- ">

rco

c Si

- ^

IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS H^Lfc L - S o
o 2
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUElfTOJB r, .'S> CO
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED XT ~ ' t:
c
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT.
£ 4" £ '0 o 5

c: *

^

w. £
w 0

ro

IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON 1H£
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS
C |D .
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.
£ E£
en
«— til
O C/)
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.

cc:

William R. Russell
Attorney at Law
102 West 500 South #202
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

DI 203

I

•£

x:

2
?— ^-n
•*

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
^X<i
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, DIRECTOR
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES

c

2c

,03

o ^
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o
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o
c
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ADDENDUM F

COPY FOR YOUR
HtTpr-^:::!
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833)
Attorney for Plaintiff
102 West 500 South, #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-5904

r »

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VERDON C. BRINKERHOFF,
EX PARTE MOTION FOR
STAY OF ORDER OF
SUSPENSION

Pet itioner,
vs,
FRED C. SCHKENDIMAN,Director,
and the Office of Driver
License Services,

Case No. ffgO<?01g?4A A

Respondent.
The Petitioner, VerDon Brinkcrhoff, by his attorney of
record William R. Russell, hereby moves this Court, EX PARTE, for
its Order staying the operation of the Order of Suspension of the
Petitioner's

driving

privilege,

which

was

issued

by

the

Department of Public Safety, Office of Driver License Services.
In support thereof, Petitioner respectfully shows this
Court:
1.

Petitioner has petitioned this Court for judicial

review, by Trial

De Novo, of the Order of

Suspension

of

his

driving privilege for three months pursuant to Section 41-2-131
Utah Code Ann.
2.

Unless such stay is granted, operation of the

Suspension will work immediate, permanent
upon

the Petitioner

as he will

be unable

and

irreparable

harm

to operate

a motor

remedy

law,

vehicle to and from his place of employment.
3.

Petitioner

has

no

adequate

at

as

prospective monetary damages are incalculable.
4.
require

any

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court not
security

be

given

by

me

in

that

the

rights

of

defendants affected by the relief sought arc not so significant
and/or

capable

of

being

security be posted.
Petitioner's

quantified

that

would

require

that

In addition, defendants will not suffer if

driving

privilege

is

restored

pending

judicial

by

Verified

review.
This

Motion

is

further

supported

the

Petition filed herein.

DATED this

2

day of December, 1988.

WILLIAM R. RUSSELL
Attorney for Petitioner
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this
y
day of December,
1988, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Motion, postage
prepaid, to
Mr. Bruce
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

M. Hale, Jr.
Attorney General
Capitol
City, UT 84114

14ItlLJ

Ui.C
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833)
Attorney for Petitioner
102 West 500 South, «202
Salt Lake City, Utah 8-1101
Telephone: (801) 322-5904

VERDON C.

r

j / 3 i.7/PBf.ijli'

^jMltl-U
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

COPY FOR YOUR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

INFORMATION

BRINKER1IOFF,

Petitioner,
STAY OF ORDER OF
SUSPENSION

vs.
FRED C. SCHWF.NDIMAN, Director,
and the Office of Driver
License Services,

Case No.ffffQ?Q7^2 H AA

Respondents.
The Motion of Petitioner, VerDon C. Brinkerhoff, for a
stay of the operation of the Order of Suspension of his driving
privileges,

issued

by

the

Utah

Department

of

Public

Safety,

Office of Driver License Services, having come before this Court
J

Ex Parte for hearing this
Court

having

reviewed

day of December, 1988, and the

the Verified

Petition

and other

matters

filed herein, and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

That

the

operation

of

the

Order

of

Suspension

issued by the above agency, effective November 25, 1988, relating
to the driving privileges

of the Petitioner,

is hereby

stayed

during the pendency of these proceedings.
2.

The Office of Driver License Services is commanded

to forthwith amend any and all records and/or data relating to
the driving privileges of the Petitioner

to reflect

that

such

privilege is in effect, until further order of this Court.

DATED thjs

^

day of December, 1988

Certificate of Mailing

1
I hereby
1988, I mailed a
Suspension, postage
Mr. Bruce
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

>/*

certify jthat on this
D
copy or. the foregoing
prepaid,\ to
M. Hale, Jr.
Attorney General
Capitol
City, UT 84114

day of December,
Stay of Order of

^TATC OF UTAH
. !
COUNTY Or 3ALT LAKE )

ss
- - Ti.:r nr^niCT

D U R T 0 T SALT LAKC OO'.ruTY. L,"i A!!. V.-O HJ3<nY
COCK
Cr.RTlrY THAT
A TRUC AW
WENT ON H
VVlTNfr^
TH;G Jp,
H. OIXQN HIND

NORMAN H BANGERTER. GOVERNOR

JOHN T NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER
DOUGLAS BODRERO. OEPUTY COMMISSIONER
L OALE ELTON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

STATE O F UTAH
DEPARTMENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY

Verdon C. Brinkerhoff
917 Park Row
Salt Lake City, Ut 84105

File No.
D.O.B.

1434579
8-5-38

Dear driver:
In compliance with an Order from the Court, your driving privilege
has been reinstated pending your appeal of an Order of Suspension
resulting from your arrest for Driving Under the Influence.
Any further action in this matter will depend upon the disposition
of your appeal.
If your driver's license has been received by this department, it
has been enclosed herein.

Very truly yours,

Fred C. Schwendiman
Bureau Chief
Driver License Services
cc: William R. Russell
Attorney at Law
102 W. 500 So. #202
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101

DRIVER LICENSE-DRIVER IMPROVEMENT & CONTROL
Fred C. Schwendiman. Bureau Chief

4501 South 2700 West
Salt lake City, Utah 84119 - 965-4437

ADDENDUM G

R712-017 OTAH DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
R712-017-1 The short title of this rule shall be Driver License Division,
Rules for Adainistrative Proceedings.
R712-017-2 Authority
The authority for these rules is U.C.A. 41-2-102.5 and 63-46b-l et seq.
(1988).
R712-017-3 Definitions
The following terms and phrases are defined as follows:
(1) Division - the division is the Driver License Division of the Utah
Department of Public Safety.
(2) Division Record - the division record shall consist of its entire
file including written reports by the department employees and documents or
exact copies received, including information received by magnetic or
electronic means or otherwise. It includes minutes, written comments, the
presiding officer's written statements and summaries of the material,
testimony, evidence and findings of fact and law, recommendations and orders.
(3) Hearing - a hearing is an informal adjudicative proceeding where
evidence is taken to determine an issue of fact and adjudicate a prior legal
right based on the division record, evidence, documents and information.
(4) Petition - a petition is a timely, written request for agency
adjudicative action that is allowed by rule or law.
(5) Presiding Officer - A presiding officer is a division employee,
acting under the division director or supervisors with written or unwritten
responsibilities to conduct adjudicative proceedings and make decisions and
recommendations. The term "hearing officer11, as used by the division, is a
presiding officer.
(6) Recording - a recording is the verbatim magnetic tape recording of
sworn or unsworn testimony or information and may become part of the
division records. A division record may be complete without a recording.
(7) Request - a request is an application to ask the division to take
action; i.e., issue a driver license and is not a petition (request for
adjudicative hearing).
R712-017-4 Purpose and Intent of Rule
It is intended that these rules not make substantive changes in the law
but are only guidelines and procedural rules. The purpose is to clarify
procedures under the Utah Rulemaking Act and the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act as stated in the advisory committees' overview on "Coverage
of the Act" ("It does not govern the substantive questions with which
agencies deal.") and "Conments to the Act" taking the federal approach.
The rule is not intended to extend legal rights, privileges or duties not
granted or required by Utah law. These rules are intended to facilitate the
administration of the driver's license statutes contained in Title 4 of the
Utah Code and to maintain the highest degree of public safety possible.
These rules do not apply to nonadjudicative actions that are required by
Utah law. Examples of nonadjudicative actions required by the Utah Code
are: the initial issuance of a driving permit subject to the statutory
conditions and requirements to obtain a license contained under U.C.A.
41-2-103 through 125 (1987). This also includes nonadjudicative actions
mandated by law based on a receipt of an official record under U.C.A.
41-2-127, U.C.A. 41-2-601, (the Nonresident Violator Compact), U.C.A.
41-2-501, (the Driver License Compact) and U.C.A. 41-12a (Financial

Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act). These examples
are not all inclusive.
R712-017-S Petitions for Adjudication
Fetitions requesting division adjudicative action or responses to notice
of agency action must be timely filed with the division, must be written,
clear and concise and include but not limited to the following.
(1) A clear designation of the parties with any necessary data including
the date of the prior occurrence or action.
(2) The reason for the petition.
(3) The petitioner's full name, address, zip code, telephone number, and
driver license number or date of birth or division file number.
(4) The petition must be dated, signed and timely received. The
department will not proceed on a petition unless the above requirements are
reasonably met or the division is required to by statute.
R712-017-6 Designations
All division adjudicative actions except actions mandated by statute are
designated to be informal proceedings unless converted to formal in the
discretion of the presiding officer or supervisor. The presiding officer
may convert an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding only if approved
by his supervisor and the conversions will enhance efficiency of the
proceeding and it will not unreasonably increase costs and it is in the
interest of public safety. Recordings may be made in adjudicative
proceedings under U.C.A. 41-2-130, 201, 202, 41-6-44.10, 41-2-12a et seq.
R712-017-7 Hearings
Hearings or informal adjudicative proceedings will be held only if
required by Title 41, Chapters 2, 6, 12(a) of the Utah Code. There must
also be a timely written petition and a controversy involving a prior valid
license.
R712-017-8 Hearing Procedures
The adjudicative proceedings will be held in the various locations used by
the division throughout the state at the times and places designated by the
division director or employees or at a place agreed to by the petitioner and
the division. The hearings should be open, informative, informal orderly
proceedings.
(1) Timeliness. Adjudicative proceedings will only be held if there is a
timely written petition, request or response. A petition for adjudication
must be filed within 20 days of the date of the action unless otherwise
required by statute or division notice or default and the action will be
entered without further notice.
(2) Evidence. The parties and witnesses may testify, under oath or
affirmation, present evidence and cownent only on the pertinent issues. The
presiding officer has discretion to hear and exclude irrelevant,
repetitious, innaterial, or privileged information or evidence. The
presiding officer may consider hearsay evidence. The presiding officer may
also receive and consider documentary evidence deemed to be reliable
including copies or excerpts.
(3) Notice. Notice may be given as provided for ureJer U.C.A. 41-2-122 or
by other means, telephonic or otherwise agreed to by the parties in order to
meet the statutory requirements. All notices shall be given on forms
approved by the department. Approved forms are deemed signed by the

presiding officer. The notice need only reasonably inform the parties as to
the date, time, and basic purpose of the hearing. The parties are deemed to
have knowledge of the law. The division need not state the type of hearing
as the presiding officer may convert the informal hearing at any time as
provided under U.C.A. 63-46b-4(5).
(4) Information. The division may provide information and documents that
are not confidential and are relevant to the proceedings and issue subpoenas
for witnesses to be paid for by the requesting party if timely requested and
providing it will not delay the proceedings.
(5) Official Notice. The presiding officer has discretion to take
official notice of the Department of Public Safety's records, procedures,
rules, policies, technical or scientific facts within his or the agency's
specialized knowledge or experience or any other facts that could be
judicially noticed under Utah law.
(6) Presiding Officer. The presiding officer has discretion to decide on
the taking of evidence on the relevant issues, administer oaths and
affirmations, issue subpoenas, rule an offers of proof and the relevancy of
evidence, take depositions only if the ends of justice would so serve;
regulate the course of the hearing, hold conferences to encourage
settlement, clarify the issues, simplify the evidence, facilitate discovery,
or expedite the proceedings and dispose of all procedural requests or
similar matters. The presiding officer may limit time periods and control
the extent of argument and is not subject to the formal rules of evidence as
the factual and legal issues dictate.
One presiding officer is not bound by the decision of another presiding
officer in another proceeding.
The presiding officer may take "appropriate measures to preserve the
integrity of the hearing" UCA 63-46(b)-8(2).
(7) Conment. The presiding officer has discretion to accept written
conment and expert testimony may be invited.
(8) Record. The presiding officer may choose to make a verbatim
recording or record the testimony, information and documents on forms
provided by the division with "quotations of the verbatim testimony"
sufficient for court review.
R712-017-9 Findings, Conclusions, Recomnendations and Order
The presiding officer should make a brief written sumnary of relevant
findings of fact and the legal conclusions arrived at with a brief
recommendation. These recommendations will be final but are open to
possible review by the director or his designate. Any review will be
strictly on whether the evidence supports the findings and the law supports
the conclusions or recommendations. The director will not make choices on
the believability or integrity of the witnesses.
(1) Brevity. The findings, conclusions and recommendations should
briefly state in writing the above reasons and be signed by the presiding
officer.
(2) Material Facts - The findings should briefly "summarize" the verbatim
facts or testimony presented unless it is presented in documentary form.
(5) Recommendation - The recommendation by the presiding officer for
agency action may be in the form of check boxes on forms approved by the
director.
(4) Findings of Fact and Conclusions - The findings of fact and
conclusions may be in check box form as approved by the director on forms of
the division.

(5) Reasons - The presiding officer may give additional reasons for the
recomnendation if necessary but only if the reasons are not obvious.
(6) Transmit - The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
presiding officer should be transmitted to a superior as soon as possible
for preparation of an order. They may be in computerized, handwritten,
typed or in any form reasonably calculated to facilitate the proceeding arcl
review.
(7) Notice to the Petitioner - The division will mail to the petitioner
written notice of the order to the last known address of the petitioner or
parties as provided in U.C.A 41-2-122. The written findings, conclusions
and recocrmendations are available only to the parties and upon request in
writing.
R712-017-10 Division Discretion
The Department of Public Safety and the Driver License Division maintains
any discretion granted by law or statute and is not limited in its
discretion by these rules.
R712-017-11 Exemptions
These rules do not apply if the director or a presiding officer finds
imminent peril to public safety health or welfare.
R712-017-12 Procedural Only
These rules are subject to change as needed and these rules will be
periodically reviewed by the division in light of its experience and any
changes in common or statutory law. They are intended to be procedural only
and to not to dictate any substantive law.
R712-017-13 Prior Policies
These rules adopt the prior actions, procedures, forms, policy statements,
and rules of the division as they are considered part of the division's
present policies and procedures that comply or will comply with the intent
of these rules and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
R712-017-14 Failure to Respond
If the petitioner fails to timely respond to a departmental request or
notice, default will be deemed and the division will take the action stated
in the notice or order or whatever action it deems necessary under the
circumstances.
R712-017-15 Ti*e
The division maintains discretion to shorten or lengthen any time periods
deemed to be necessary in the interest of public safety or as required or
permitted by Utah law. This rule is not intended to change any
jurisdictional statutory time periods. In computing any prescribed time
period not covered by division rule time periods may be computed in
accordance with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R712-017-16 Knowledge of the Law Presumed
The division deems that the petitioner has a knowledge of the published
Utah law and these rules and the division policies and, therefore, need not
delineate and inform petitioner of all possible issues, basis, or content of
the Utah Operators License Act.

R712-017-17 Declaratory Orders
The division will not issue declaratory orders and any orders or
reconmendations are not deemed to be declaratory orders unless a declaratory
statement is deemed necessary by the division director.
R712-017-18 Stays
Any division orders issued subsequent to adjudicative proceedings are
final and will not be stayed by the division or its employees nor will the
division respond to petitions for stays of final division orders except by
court order under extraordinary or rare circumstances showing inmediate,
substantial, irreparable injury and inminent danger to public safety, health
or welfare.
R712-017-19 Emergency Proceedings
The division orders and proceedings, especially those under 41-2-127 to
130, are not emergency proceedings under U.C.A. 63-46b-20 but complies with
the statutory mandates of the substantive driver license acts. Notice and
orders are not emergency even though the time periods may be under 30 days.
R712-017-20 Construction
These rules shall be construed to secure a prompt and economical
detennination of the relevant issues before the division and to comply with
the general procedural intent and purpose of U.C.A. 63-46b et seq.
R712-017-21 Severability
In the event any part of these rules may be held unconstitutional or
unenforceable the remaining parts are severed and effective.
KEY:
1987

Administrative Proceedings

41-2-102.5
63-46b-l

ADDENDUM H

63-46b-l

Comments - UALAC

Comments of the

Ulih Administrative
Law Advisory Committee

on the Drafting and Interpretation of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(Including the 19M Amendment*)
Using the 1981 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) as a guide and
adapting the MSAPA to Utah's needs, the Utah
Administrative Law Advisory Committee (Advisory
Committee) drafted the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) The Advisory Committee,
appointed by Attorney CeneraJ David L Wilkinson,
consisted of the following members Stephen M
Hadley. Carl S Hawkins. Dalhn W Jensen. D
Mark Jones, KayCee McCmley; Stephen F.
Mecham. Karl N Snow. Jr ; AJan L. Sullivan. A
Robert Thorup, and Stephen G Wood Mr.
Hawkins served as chairman and Mr Wood served
as reporter to the Advisory Committee from April
1983 until December 1986 In December 1986, Mr.
Wood was appointed as chairman, Mr Sullivan was
appointed as vice-chairman and Mr Thorup was
appointed to direct the lobbying efforts of the
Advisory Committee on behalf of the UAPA
The Advisory Committee prepared two sets of
Committee Comments for the UAPA The original
set was based on discussions within the Advisory
Committee and explanations given by the Advisory
Committee to the Legislature and its committees
dunng the legislative process in 1987 When the
UAPA - Senate Bill No 35 before the 1987
General Session of the Utah Legislature - was
passed by the House of Representatives on February
23. 1987, Representative Bishop, the House sponsor,
moved to reproduce and make available to the
public the Committee Comments as part of the
legislative history of the UAPA This motion was
unanimously adopted See House Journal. Day 43,
February 23, 1987, at 705 When the Legislature
unanimously passed the Utah Administrative An
Amendments - Senate Bill No 86 before the 1988
General Session of the Utah Legislature - in 1988.
the Advisory Committee revised the original set of
Committee Comments to reflect the changes made
b> this legislation The revised Committee Comments, like the original Committee Comments, were
based on discusssions within the Advisory Committee and explanations given by the Advisory Committee to the Legislature and its committees during
the legislative process The purpose of the Committee Comments is to assist all - the public, state
agencies, the courts and attorneys • who will use
the UAPA to better understand its provisions
43-46*-1 Scope and Applicability COMMENTS
Subject to the exceptions enumerated in Sections
6 3 - 4 6 b l < 2 ) . 63 46b-1(5) and 6 3 - 4 6 b - l ( 7 ) .
Section 63-46b 1(1) states that the UAPA covers
all adjudicative proceedings conducted by state
agencies of the State of Utah and judicial review of
these adjudicative proceedings
The procedures contained in the UAPA supercede
existing, conflicting procedures in other statutes In
this connection, the Legislature required the Advisory Committee to prepare specific repealers of
existing, conflicting procedures in other statutes.

10

Section 63-46b-2(lMt) defines 'adjudicative
proceeding* to mean *an agency action or proceeding described in Section 63-466-1/ See also
Section 68-3-12 Section 68-3-12 it not a part
of the UAPA but contains generic definitions and
rules of construction Section 68-3-i2(2)(a)
defines 'adjudicative proceeding* to mean *(i) all
actions by a board, commission, department,
officer, or other administrative unit of the state that
determine the legai rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons, including all actions to grant, deny,
revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or
amend an authority, right, or license, and (u) judicial review of all such actions. *
Section 63-46b-2(l)(b) defines 'agency* to
include *a board, commission, department officer or
other administrative unit of this State, including the
Agency Head, agency employees, or other persons
acting on behalf of or under the authority of the
Agency Head* but to exclude 'the Legislature, the
courts . . . the Governor' and 'any political subdivision of the State or any administrative unit of a
political subdivision of the State *
The UAPA does not cover rulemaking See
Section 63-46b-t(2Xt). The UAPA, however,
should not be interpreted as discouraging agencies
from engaging in appropriate rulemaking, particularly rulemaking to elaborate on agency procedure
consistent with the UAPA. See Section 63-46b1(6) Rulemaking is governed by the Administrative
Rule Making Act rather than the UAPA See Utah
Code Annotated 63-46a-l et scq
The UAPA does not cover proceedings that are
informational or investigative rather than adjudicative The UAPA also docs not cover certain agency
actions that might otherwise be classified as adjudicative proceedings See Sections 63-46b-l(2Mb)
through 63-46b-!(2Xn) Sections 63-46b-l(2Mb)
through 63-46b-l(2Kn) axe functional exemptions
to the UAPA that should be construed narrowly to
effectuate uniformity in adjudicative proceedings
The UAPA does not cover 'contracts for the
purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies,
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for
an agency of the state, except as provided in such
contracts . . . . ' See Section 63-46b-l(2Kg) This
functional exemption does not exempt leases that
are the equivalent of a permit or license
The UAPA does not affect legal remedies otherwise available to compel an agency to take action or
to challenge an agency's rules See Section 63-4661(3)
An agency, prior to the beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer, dunng an
adjudicative proceeding, is authonzed to request or
order conferences with parties and interested persons
to facilitate settlement or streamline the adjudicative
proceeding See Section 63-46b-l(4) Consequently, some of the purposes of such conferences are
to encourage settlement, to clarify the issues, to
simplify the evidence, to facilitate discovery, or to
expedite the proceedings A presiding officer is also
authonzed to grant a timely motion either to dismiss
or for summary judgment, if the requirements of
Rules 12(b) or 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the UAPA axe met The well-developed
casctaw concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist
presiding officers in deciding motions made under
Section 63-46b-1(9)
Section 63-46©-1(7) has some similanty to the
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section I-
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104) The intent of the Committee it that Section 63
46b l p ) be narrowly construed
The UAPA is not an aJternative source of juru
d>ct»on See Section 63-46b-l(8) The approach of
the UAPA is identical to the federal approach See
CaJifanov Sanders. 430 U S 90(1977)
A presiding officer is authorized to lengthen or
shorten lime periods prescribed by the UAPA for
food cause See Section 63-46b 1(9) Time
periods for judicial revie*. howeveT, are not affe
cted by Section 6 3-46 b 1(9) The Advisory
Committee, moreover, urges agencies to use the
authont) contained in Section 63-46b-l(9) span
nglv to preserve the uniformity of procedure man
dated by the Legislature
4J-46b-2 Definitions COMMENTS
The UAPA contains many terms that require
definition Many of the definitions chosen were
borrowed from the MSAPA
Section 63 46b2(l)(a) of the UAPA and
Section 68 3 12 which contains general rules of
statutory construction define 'adjudicative procee
dings * The MSAPA does not define "adjudicative
proceedings ' Section 1 102(2) of the MSAPA does
define 'agency anion • a term that embraces both
adjudicative proceedings and rulemaking
Section 63-46b-2(IXb) is patterned after the
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1
102(1))
Section 63~46b 2(IXc) is identical to the com
parable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1102(3))
Section 63-46b20Xe) u identical to the com
parable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1102(4))
Section 63-46b 2(1X0 is partially patterned
after the comparable provisions in the MSAPA
(Sections 1 102(6) and 1-102(7)) The intent of
the Advisory Committee is that Section 63-46b
2(1X0 be broadl) construed
Section 63-46b 2(1 Kg) is patterned after the
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 1
102(8)) The intent of the Advisory Committee is
that Section 63-46b 2( 1 Kg) be broadly construed
Section 63-46b20Xh) is partially patterned
after the comparable provision in the MSAPA
(Section 4 202(a)) Although Section 63-46b
2(1 Xh) is found in the definitional section of the
UAPA the provision particularly Sections 63-46b
2(IXhXw) and 63-46b 2(IXhXn») is not strictly
definitional but imposes directions to and limitations
on those persons who can serve as a presiding
officer See also Section 63-46b 2(2)
The Advisory Committee considered defining but
chose not to define the following terms decision, de
novo rev>r*, hearing and order The Advisory
Committee concluded that these terms have an accepted legal meaning in the State of Utah and that
any ambiguities ought to be resolved within the
judicial system
45-46b-3 Commencement of Adjudicative
Proceedings COMMENTS
Adjudicative proceedings can be commenced
either by an agency (Section 63-46b-3(IX*)) or by
a person other than an agency (Section 63-46b*0Xb))
Section 63-46b 3(2XaX«) is identical to the
comparable provision in the MSAPA (Section 4206(cX6)) Sections 63-46b 3(2XaXO and 63-46b£(2XaX>x) are patterned after the comparable prov
i&ions in the MSAPA (Sections 4-206<cXl). 4Co«»Co
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206(c)(2) and 4 206(c)(5)) Sections 63 46b
3(2)(a)(n). 63-46b 3(2)(a)(vn) and 63 46b 3
(2XaXxi) have some similarity to the comparable
provisions in the MSAPA (Sections 4-206(cX3) 4206(cX4) 4-206<cX8)and4-2O6<cX7))
The agency's role in eliciting the information
required by Section 63-46b 2(3Xa) and (b) can be
active as well as passive Section 63-46b 2(3Mc)
authorizes the agency by rule to prescribe one or
more printed forms that will serve as the request for
agency action when completed and filed with the
agency This same form could provide space and
guidance consistent with the UAPA for an> resp
onse due from a person who is required to respond
to the request for agency action The agencv also
can provide personnel who will answer questions or
assist individuals in completing and processing the
request for agency action
Nonce normally is given by mail in the case of
adjudicative proceedings commenced bv a person
other than the agency Nonce can be given by pub
lication when required bv statute Compare Sections
63-46b 3(2XbX")and63-46b 3(3XeKu)
A written response within 30 davs is normallv
required for formal adjudicative proceedings See
S e c t i o n s 63 46b 3 ( 2 ) ( a ) ( v i ) and 63 46b
3(3XeXi"XD) Agencies can facilitate compliance
with this requirement by designing forms that satisfv
the requirement Response times shorter than 30
days are permitted if required b> applicable federal
law See Section 63-46b 3(5) Response times
longer than 30 days are permitted on the basis of an
agency rule See Section 63-46b 3(5) The agenc>
must provide for a longer response time in advance
and only for certain designated classes of adjudica
tive proceedings Normallv no comparable requir
ement exists for informal adjudicative proceedings
Compare Sections 63-46b 3(2xaX*i) and 63-46b
5(IXa)
The default provisions of the UAPA referred to
in Section 63-46b-3(2X*Xvii) are found in Section
63-46b 11
Commencement of an adjudicative proceeding bv
a person other than an agency is not a matter of
right but depends on the existence of a law permit
ting the initiation of an adjudicative proceeding
Section 63-46b 3(3XeXmXD) embodies a reas
onableness standard The notice provision should be
construed and applied to facilitate notice to persons
reasonably known to be interested The nonce pro
vision does not impose a responsibility to locate
persons whose identit) is unknown or whose I oca
lion cannot be reasonably discovered
Some agencies ma> be involved in adjudicative
proceedings where there are multiple applications
from competing applicants Section 6^-46b 2(7)
authorizes agencies in this situation to consolidate
these multiple competing applications into a single
comparative adjudicative proceeding
Section 63 46b 2(4) provides that agencies
should set by rule the time within which a request
for agency anion must be filed *ith the agencv in
cases where initial agency determinations or actions
are not governed by the UAPA but review of these
initial agency determinations or actions are governed
by the UAPA The intent of the Advisory Commi
nee is that this provision be interpreted as encour
aging agencies to promulgate such rules The failure
of an agency to provide a time period normallv
should be interpreted to mean that the period for
filing is continuously open in the absence of unusual
circumstances
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63-46a-16

(JJ) any Mctton tali en by an Agency in re- 63-46a-)2. Interested parties.
sponse to committee recommendations, and
(1) An interested person may petition an agency
(in) any recommendations by the commit- requesting the making, amendment, or repeal of a
toe for legislation
its* rule
(2) The division shall prescribe by rule the form for
63-46a-ll£. Legislative
reauthorization
of petitions and the procedure for their submission, conagency rules — Extension of rules by sideration, and disposition
governor.
(3) A statement shall accompany the proposed
(1) All grants of rulemaking power from the Legis- rule, or amendment or repeal of a rule, demonstratlature to a state agencv in any statute are made sub- ing that the proposed action is within the jurisdiction
ject to the provisions of this section
of the agency and appropnate to the powers of the
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), every agency
agency rule that is in effect on January 1 of any
(4) Within 30 days after submission of a petition,
calendar year expires on May 1 of that year un- the agency shall either deny the petition in a writing
less it has been reauthorized by the Legislature stating its reasons for the denial, or initiate rulemakduring its annual genera) session
ing proceedings in accordance with Section 63-46a-4
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsec1W7
tion (lKa), an agency's rules do not expire if
(l) the rule is explicitly mandated by a fed- 63-46a-13. Declaratory judgment to determine
validity of rule.
eral law or regulation, or
(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be
(n) a provision of Utah's constitution vests
the agency with specific constitutional au- determined in an action for declaratory judgment in
any distnct court of this state with appropnate
thority to regulate
(3) (a) Prior to January 1 of each year, the Admin- venue, if it is alleged that the rule, or its potential
istrative Rules Review Committee shall have application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens
omnibus legislation prepared for consideration to interfere with or impair, the legal nghts or pnviby the Legislature during its annual general ses- leges of the plaintiff
(2) In an action for declaratory judgment on a rule,
sion
(b) The omnibus legislation shall be substan- the agency shall be made a party to the action
(3) A declaratory judgment by a court may be rentially in the following form "All rules of Utah
state agencies are reauthorized except for the fol- dered whether or not the plaintifT has requested the
agency to pass upon the applicability of the rule in
lowing "
(c) Before sending the legislation to the gover- question However, the issue of applicability may not
nor for his action, the Administrative Rules Re- be determined by the distnct court while the issue is
view Committee shall send a letter to the gover- under consideration by the agency dunng any pronor and to the agency explaining specifically why ceeding pending before that agency or dunng the
the committee believes any rule should not be time the agency's decision concerning applicability is
subject to appeal or being considered on appeal 1985
reauthorized
(4) The Legislature's reauthorization of a rule by 63-46a-14. Contesting a rule.
legislation does not constitute legislative approval of
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of
the rule, nor is it admissible in any proceeding as noncompliance with the procedural requirements of
evidence of legislative intent
this chapter shall commence within two years of the
(5) (a) If an agency believes that a rule that has effective date of the rule
i«*5
not been reauthorized by the Legislature or that
will be allowed to expire should continue in full 63-46a~15. Repealed.
lass
force and effect and is a rule within their authorized rulemaking power, the agency may seek 63-46a-16. Utah Administrative Code as official
the governor's declaration extending the rule becompilation of rules.
yond the expiration date
The code shall be received in all the courts, and by
(b) In seeking the extention, the agency shall all the judges, public officers, commissions, and desubmit a petition to the governor that affirma- partments of the state government as evidence of the
administrative law of the state of Utah and as an
tively states
authorized compilation of the administrative law of
(i) that the rule is necessary, and
is«7
(n) a citation to the source of its authonty Utah
to make the rule
(c) d) If the governor finds that the necessity
CHAPTER 46b
does exist, and that the agency has the authonty to make the rule, he may declare the
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
rule to be extended by publishing that declaration in the Administrative Rules Bulletin Section
on or before April 15 of that year
63 -46b-1
Scope and applicability of chapter
(n) The declaration shall set forth the rule 63-46b-2
Definitions
to be extended, the reasons the extention is 63-46b-3
Commencement of adjudicative proceednecessary, and a citation to the source of the
ings
agency's authonty to make the rule
63-46b-4
Designation of adjudicative proceedings
(d) If the omnibus bill required b> Subsection
as formal or informal
(3) fails to pass both houses of the Legislature, 63-46b-5
Procedures for informal adjudicative
the governor may declare all rules to be extended
proceedings
by publishing a single declaration in the Admin- 63-46b-6
Procedures for formal adjudicative proistrative Rules Bulletin on or before April 15
ceedings -Responsive pleadings
without meeting requirements of Subsections (b) 63-46b-7.
Procedures for formal adjudicative pro•ad (c).
tmm
ceedings—Discovery and subpoenas
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lined in Chapter 46a, Title 63. the Uuh Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the
requirements of this chapter.
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provision of this chapter would
result in the denial of funds or services to an agency
of the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial
The attorney general shall report the suspension to
the Legislature at its next session
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown,
from lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial review.
isss
63-46b~2. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an
agency action or proceeding described in Section
63-46b-l.
(b) "Agency* means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of
this state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or
under the authority of the agency head, but does
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision of the state, or any
administrative unit of a political subdivision of
the state.
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body
of individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested by statute.
(d> "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and governed by Section
63-46b-21.
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by statute.
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association,
political subdivision or its units, governmental
subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of any character, or another
agency.
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency
head, or an individual or body of individuals
designated by the agency head, by the
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an
adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may substitute one presiding officer for another during any proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a proceeding need not
continue as presiding officer through all
phases of a proceeding.
«) "Respondent" means a person against
W
k k a n a ( ^ u d i c a t i v e proceeding is initiated,
whether by an agency or any other person.

63-46b-3

(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review the orders
of another agency.
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency
head or the presiding officers with responsibility for
adjudicative proceedings before the agency
lies
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section
63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedingB are
commenced by the agency, or
(b> a request for agency action, if proceedings
are commenced by persons other than the
agency.
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and
served according to the following requirements:
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in
writing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall
include:
(i> the names and mailing addresses of all
persons to whom notice is being given by the
presiding officer, and the name, title, and
mailing address of any attorney or employee
who has been designated to appear for the
agency;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally
according to the provisions of rules adopted
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5. or formally according to the provisions of Sections
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
formal, a statement that each respondent
must file a written response within 30 days
of the mailing date of the notice of agency
action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
formal, or if a hearing is required by statute
or rule, a statement of the time and place of
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the
purpose for which the hearing is to be held,
and a statement that a party who fails to
attend or participate in the hearing may be
held in default;
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be informal and a hearing is required by
statute or rule, or if a hearing is pernuUed
by rule and may be requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a hearing
within the time provided by the agency's
rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative
proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and
telephone number of the presiding officer;
and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the extent known
by the presiding officer, the questions to be
decided.

63-466-4
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(b) When adjudicative proceedings are com
menced by the agency, the agency shall
u) mail the notice of agency action to each
F>art>.
(u) publish the notice of agency action, if
required bv statute, and
(in) mail the notice of agencv action to
any other person who has a nght to notice
under statute or rule
(3) (a) Where the la* applicable to the agencv permits persons other than the agency to initiate
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request
for agencv action shall be in writing and signed
bv the person invoking the jurisdiction of the
agencv, or b> his representative, and shall include
<i) the names and addresses of all persons
to whom a copv of the request for agency
action is being sent,
(u> the agencv s file number or other ref
erence number, if known,
(in> the date that the request for agencv
action was mailed
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which agency action is requested
(v) a statement of the relief or action
sought from the agencv, and
(vi> a statement of the facts and reasons
forming the basis for relief or agency action
(b) The person requesting agency action shall
file the request with the agency and shall send a
copv b> mail to each person known to have a
direct interest in the requested agencv action
(O An agencv may, b> rule, prescribe one or
more printed forms eliciting the information required bv Subsection (3><a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed and filed
by the person requesting agency action
(d> The presiding officer shall promptly review
a request for agency action and shall
(i) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is granted and that the ad
judicative proceeding is completed,
(n) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding that
the part> mav request a heanng before the
agencv to challenge the denial, or
(in) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine
the agency's response to the request
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection
(3>(d>'n> shall contain the information required by Subsection 63-46b-5<l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection
(3Md)(u) of this section
(n) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3Hd> to all parties, ex
cept that any notice required by Subsection
(3)(d>(ui) may be published when publication
is required by statute
(in) The notice required by Subsection
(3><d)<Hi) shall
(A) give the agency's file number or
other reference number,
(B) give the name of the proceeding
(C) designate whether the proceeding
is one of a category to be conducted informally according to the provisions of
rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4
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cable rule authorizing that designation,
or formally according to the provisions
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll,
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding and where respondent
parties are known, state that a written
response must be filed within 30 days of
the date of the agency's notice if mailed
or within 30 days of the last publication
date of the agency's notice, if published,
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in
an informal adjudicative proceeding
state the time and place of any sched
uled hearing, the purpose for which the
heanng is to be held, and that a party
who fails to attend or participate in a
scheduled and noticed hearing may be
held in default,
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be informal, and a heanng is required
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested b>
a party within the time prescribed by
rule, state the parties' right to request a
hearing and the time within which a
hearing may be requested under the
agency's rules, and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking review must be filed
with the agency within the time prescribed by the
agency's rules
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceed
mgs, an agencv may, by rule, provide for a longer
response time than allowed by this section, and ma>
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or
order, applications for licenses filed under authority
of Chapters 3, 4, and 5, Title 32A, are not considered
to be a request for agenc> action under this chapter
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is
to award a license or other privilege as to which there
are multiple competing applicants, the agency mav,
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or
privilege
i*88
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as formal or informal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted mfor
mally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not
violate any procedural requirement imposed bv a
statute other than this chapter,
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected b> the informal procedures,
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's sd
ministrative efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations, and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceeding*
outweighs the potential benefits to the public o! 8
formal adjudicative proceeding
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(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules
shall be conducted formal 1> in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any
adjudicative proceeding the presiding officer may
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest, and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party
is«7
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings the agency shall, by
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings that include the following
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and
requires a response no answer or other pleading
responsive to the allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the request for agency
action need b e fi\ed
(b) The agency shall hold a h e a n n g if a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing
is permitted b> rule and is requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule
(c) In any hearing the parties named in the
notice of agency action or in the request for
agency action shall be permitted to testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties
(e) Discovery is prohibited but the agency
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel
production of necessary evidence
(f) All parties shall have access to information
contained in the agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted bv law
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the
agency may enact rules permitting intervention
where a federal statute or rule requires that a
state permit intervention
(h) All heanngs shall be open to all parties
d) Within a reasonable time after the close of
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing
that states the following
d) the decision,
(n) the reasons for the decision,
(in) a notice of any nght of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties,
and
dv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review
(J) The presiding officer's order shall be based
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and
on the facts presented m evidence at any hearings
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall
(2M ? T p t l y m a i l e d to e a Ph o f t h e Parties
(M A * g e n c y m a y r e c o r d a n y h e a n n g
f»!!L y P a r t y ' a t h l 8 o w n e x D € n 8 e . may have a
2? n 7*jaPProved by the agency prepare a tranpl trom
the agency's record of the hearing

63-46b-8

(3) Nothing in this taction restricts or precludes
any investigative right or power given to an agency
by another statute
isss
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Responsive pleadings.
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5),
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written
response signed by the respondent or his representative within 30 days of the mailing date or last date of
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include
(a) the agency's file number or other reference
number,
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding,
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks,
(d) a statement of the facts, and
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that
the relief requested should be granted
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule,
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the
notice of agency action, the request for agency action,
and the response All papers permitted or required to
be f\\ed *V>fcU be filed ^w\th the agency and one copy
shall be sent by mail to each party
1988
63-46b~7. P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Discovery and subpoenas.
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses If
the agency does not enact rules under this section,
the parties may conduct discovery according to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence in
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the
presiding officer when requested by any party, or
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own
motion
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes
any investigative n g h t or power given to an agency
by another statute
1SS7
63-46b-8.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal adjudicative
p r o c e e d i n g s — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(dKi)
and (n), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a
bearing Bhatt be conducted as foWows
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious,
(u) shall exclude evidence privileged in
the courts of Utah,
(in) ma> receive documentary evidence in
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document,
(iv) may take official notice of any facts
that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of
other proceedings before the agency, and of

63-46b-9
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technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge
<c> The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay
(d> The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity Co present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
<e> The presiding officer may give persons not
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing
(D All testimony presented at the hearing, if
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g> The hearing shall be recorded at the
agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose
to protect confidential information disclosed at
the hearing
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to
preserve the integrity of the hearing.
lses
63-46b-9.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a Formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each
party. The petition shall include:
(a i the agency's file number or other reference
number;
(b> the name of the proceeding;
<c> a statement offsets demonstrating that the
petitioners legal rights or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervener under any provision of law; and
id) a statement of the relief that the petitioner
seeks from the agency.
(2> The presiding officer shall grant a petition for
intervention if he determines that:
<a> the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative
proceeding, and
(b> the interests of justice and the orderly and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings
will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to
intervene shall be in writing and sent by mail to
the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervener's participation
in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary
for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention.
1M7
63-46b-10.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
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the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings offset based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officiary noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d> a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties, and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
1S88

63*46b~ll. D e f a u l t
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative
proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section
63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of
th* grounds for default and shall be mailed to all
parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the
agency set aside the default order, and any order
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent
to the default order, by following the procedures
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding
officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision o(the
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, an*r
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the a * u jr?
tive proceeding without the participation of U*
party in default and shall determine all issue* in
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the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party
tV> In art adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the part> in
default, the presiding officer shall after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding i*w

63-46b-15

superior agency under Section 63-46b 12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action anv party m a \ file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested
(b) Unless otherwise provided bv statute the
63-46b-12. A g e n c y review — P r o c e d u r e .
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit paring judicial review of the order
ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, with the agency and one copy shall be sent b> mail to
the aggrieved party may file a written request each party by the person making the request
for review within 30 davs after the issuance of
(3) (a» The agency head or a person designated for
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
that purpose by the statute or rule
the request or denying the request
(b) The request shall
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
(i) be signed by the party seeking review,
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
(u) state the grounds for review and the
days after the filing of the request the request
relief requested,
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de(in) state the date upon which it was
nied
1968
mailed, and
(IV) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies
and to each part}
( D A party aggrieved mav obtain judicial review of
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period provided final agency action except in actions where judicial
b> agency rule, whichever is longer, an> party may review is expressly prohibited bv statute
(2) A part\ ma\ seek judicial review only after exfile a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response One copy of the re- hausting all administrative remedies available, exsponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and cept that
to the presiding officer
(a) 8 party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
of an order by the agency or a superior agencv, the
required,
agency or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
(b) the court may relieve a part) seeking judiby statute or the agency's rules
cial review of the requirement to exhaust anv or
all administrative remedieb if
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior
(I) the administrative remedies are inadeagency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
quate, or
bnefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument
(n) exhaustion of remedies would result in
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
all parties
public benefit derived from requiring ex
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
haustion
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial rewithin the time required by statute or applicable
view of final agency action within 30 davs after
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
the date that the order constituting the final
written order on review
agency action is issued or is considered to have
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13*3Mb)
agency head or by a person designated by the
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
other appropriate parties as respondents and
each party
shall meet the form requirements specified in
(c) The order on review shall contain
this chapter
issa
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review,
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi(n) a statement of the issues reviewed,
cative proceedings.
(in) findings of fact as to each of the issues
<\\ <a\ The d\atuct court* *h&U have 5unsd\cUos\ to
review b> trial de novo all final agency actions
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedissues reviewed,
ings
(v) the reasons for the disposition,
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
or modified, and whether all or any portion
of such a venue provision, in the county where
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be rethe petitioner resides or maintains his principal
manded,
place of business
(vn) a notice of any right of further ad(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
nurastrative reconsideration or judicial readjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
view available to aggrieved parties, and
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(vni) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review
\w*
and shall include
(i) the name and mailing address of the
partv seeking judicial review,
(if, l t1 1! 3Wirl t mA rg e n c v review — Reconsideration.
> 20 days after the date that an order
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
^ued for which review by the agency or by a
respondent agency.
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63-46b-16

(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
dv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceeding* that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
<vii> a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
<3> (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section
1988
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudica-

tive proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b> The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3> The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court), except that:
(a> all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcript* and copies for the record
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record, or
(n) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following.
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as B decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
1968

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action, or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — Stay and other

temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely
to prevail on the merits when the court
finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings; and
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63-46b-21

(iv) the threat to the public health, safety,
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not basis without complying with the requirement* of
•u/Ticiently serious to justify the agency's ac- this chapter if
tion under the circumstances
1W7
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented
to the agency show that an immediate and signif«3-46b-19. Civil enforcement.
icant danger to the public health, safety, or wel(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by
fare exists; and
law. an agency may seek enforcement of an order
(b) the threat requires immediate action by
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
the agency.
courts
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an shall:
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
(a) limit its order to require only the action
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to the
to obtain civil enforcement.
public health, safety, or welfare;
(c> Venue for an action seeking civil enforce(b) issue promptly a written order, effective
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by
immediately, that includes a brief statement of
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Profindings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons
cedure
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudi<d> The action may request, and the court may
cative proceedings; and
grant, any of the following:
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who
(i) declaratory relief,
are required to comply with the order.
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive re(3) If the emergency order issued under this section
lief,
will result in the continued infringement or impair(iii) any other civil remedy provided by ment of any legal right or interest of any party, the
law; or
agency shall commence a formal adjudicative pro(iv) any combination of the foregoing
ceeding in accordance with the other provisions of
(2) (a> Any person whose interests are directly im- this chapter.
1967
paired or threatened by the failure of an agency
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a 63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that or(1) Any person may file a request for agency acder, but the action may not be commenced
tion, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff order determining the applicability of a statute, rule,
has given notice of his intent to seek civil or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency
enforcement of the alleged violation to the to specified circumstances.
agency head, the attorney general, and to
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that:
each alleged violator against whom the peti(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of
tioner seeks civil enforcement;
petitions for declaratory orders;
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions;
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil enthe agency will not issue a declaratory order;
forcement of the same order against t h e
(d> are consistent with the public interest and
same or a similarly situated defendant, or
with the general policy of this chapter; and
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of
same order has been filed and is pending in
reliable advice.
court.
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory or(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of
der if:
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the
(i) the request is one of a class of circumagency whose order is sought to be enforced, the
stances that the agency has by rule defined
agency that is vested with the power to enforce
as being exempt from declaratory orders; or
the order, and each alleged violator against
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement.
order participated in an adjudicative pro(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized
ceeding concerning the same issue within 12
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement
months of the date of the present request,
of an agency's order may not request, and the
(b) An agency m a y issue a declaratory order
court may not grant, any monetary' payment
that would substantially prejudice the rights of a
apart from taxable costs.
person who would be a necessary party, only if
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an
that person consents in writing to the determinaagency's order, in addition to any other defenses altion of the matter by 8 declaratory proceeding
lowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedthat:
(a) the order sought to be enforced w a s issued ings if:
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the
(a) they meet t h e requirements of Section
order,
63-46b-9; and
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant;
(b) they file timely petitions for intervention
\CJ ^ e ^ e f e n d a n t nAS n o t violated the order; or
according to agency rules.
to) the defendant violated the order but h a s
(5) A n agency may provide, by rule or order, that
wwequently complied,
other provisions of Sections 63-46b-4 through
01810118 on
m* t y
complaints seeking civil enforce- 63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings
ment of an agency's order are reviewable in the same
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratoryman
ner as other civil cases.
imi
order, the agency may issue a written order:
(i) declaring the applicability of the stat*>-*6b-20. E m e r g e n c y a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d ute, rule, or order in question to the specified
tags.
circumstances;
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(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative proceedings,
(in> agreeing to issue a declaratory order
within a specified time, or
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order
and stating the reasons for its action.
(b) A declaratory order shall contain:
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based;
(ii) the particular facts on which it is
based, and
(in) the reasons for its conclusion.
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a
request for a declaratory proceeding shall be
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other
parties
(d) A declaratory order has the same status
and binding effect as any other order issued in an
adjudicative proceeding
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in
writing to an extension, if an agency has not issued a
declaratory order within 60 da>6 after receipt of the
petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied.
IMS

63-46b-22. Transition procedures.
(D The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review contained in this chapter
are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings
commenced bv or before an agency on and after January 1, 1988/
(2» Statutes and rules governing agency action,
agency review, and judicial review that are in effect
on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or
before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings
are still pending before an agency or a court on January* 1.19&8
**?
CHAPTER 47
COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN
Section
63-47-1. Creation — Purpose.
63-47-2 Members — Appointment — Terms — Vacancies.
63-47-3 Qualifications of members
63-47-4. Election of chairman — Meetings.
63-47-5 Duties
63-47-6 Administrative assistant — Appointment
of personnel.
63-47-7. Authority to accept funds, gifts, and donations
63-47-8. Enactment of bylaws and rules.
63-47-1. Creation — Purpose.
There is hereby established the Governor's Commission on the Status of Women The purpose of the
commission shall be to advise and confer with the
governor and state agencies concerning issues of importance to women and families in Utah and to serve
as a contact and co-ordinating group to analyze state
and local programs to determine whether they adequately serve women and protect the rights of men,
women and families
it73
63-47-2. Members — Appointment — Terms —
Vacancies.
The commission shall consist of fifteen members to
be appointed by the governor for terms of four years,
except that initially eight members shall be appointed for four years, and seven members shall be
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appointed for two years Subsequent appointments
shall be for terms of four years Vacancies shall be
filled for the balance of the unexpired term Members
may serve two consecutive appointments
1973
63-47-3. Qualifications of m e m b e r s .
Not more than eight members of the commission
may be from one political party. Members shall be
appointed from persons with a demonstrated record of
leadership and involvement, and a willingness to
make a commitment to the furtherance of the purposes of the commission. The commission shall make
recommendations to the governor concerning appointment of members.
1973
63-47-4. Election of c h a i r m a n — Meetings.
Commission members shall elect a chairman, and
may appoint such other officers from its membership
as is deemed necessary. The commission shall meet in
regular meetings and may meet at special meetings
at the request of the chairman or the governor. 1973
63-47-5. Duties.
The commission shall take action to carry out the
following duties:
(a) Confer with and advise the governor and
heads of various state departments regarding
discriminatory legislation and practices, and the
planning of programs of particular concern to
women.
(b) Serve as a clearinghouse for co-ordination
and evaluation of programs, services and legislation affecting women.
(c) Receive and refer complaints concerning alleged violation of women's rights and responsibilities and if necessary report such action to the
governor.
(d) Conduct studies, workshops, or fact-finding
hearings to develop recommendations for constructive action in all areas of interest to women.
(e) Conduct or participate in educational programs concerning issues of importance to women
and families
(f) Encourage community organizations and
state and local units of government to institute
activities designed to meet women's needs.
(g) Participate in gaining support of changes
deemed necessary through the development of
legislation and community education.
(h) Establish a liaison between the governor
and national advisory organizations on the status of women, and represent the governor and
the state at meetings of such national organizations.
1973
63-47-6. Administrative assistant — Appointment of personnel.
The commission aha)) appoint a qualified administrative assistant to facilitate the efficient performance of the duties prescribed by this act. That person may appoint such other personnel as the commis,f7S
sion determines to be necessary.
63-47-7. Authority to accept funds, gifts, and
donations.
The commission may receive and accept federal
funds, private gifts, donations or funds from any
source All moneys shall be deposited with the state
and shall be continuously available to the comnu*'
,f7S
sion to carry out the purposes of this act
63-47-8. E n a c t m e n t of b y l a w s and rules.
The commission may enact bylaws or other rule*
for its own governance.

